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The scope of diplomatic immunity and rights claims by domestic 
workers in diplomatic households have been the subject of a series of 
cases in U.S. and U.K. courts in recent years. Parallel to these cases 
is a related but distinct body of case law on the immunities of states 
and possible exceptions to immunity claims that arise in the sphere of 
employment relations. Against this background, international law on 
state and diplomatic immunities has become increasingly fragment-
ed and uncertain in its scope and application. This Article examines 
the evolving laws of diplomatic and state immunity as they apply to 
the employment of domestic workers, with particular reference to the 
evolving case law in the United Kingdom and the United States. The 
picture that emerges is a fragmented one, suggesting continuing uncer-
tainty on the part of courts and tribunals when faced with immunity 
claims. This fragmentation and, at times, dissonance go to the heart of 
competing views of the purpose of international law and its declared 
values. The case law and evolving human rights norms examined here 
reveal a willingness to question the scope and purpose of immunity 
claims. What remains, however, is a tangled web of state and diplo-
matic immunity laws, with limited and often highly contested excep-
tions that pose significant difficulties for domestic workers who seek 
effective remedies for their claims.
IntroductIon
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U.S. and U.K. courts in recent years. Parallel to these developments is 
a related but distinct body of case law on the immunities of states and 
possible exceptions to immunity claims that may arise in the sphere 
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immunities has become increasingly fragmented and uncertain in its 
scope and application. For domestic workers, this uncertainty adds 
further to the precarious nature of their work, undermining the grad-
ual expansion and “jurisgenerative”1 potential of expanding human 
rights standards.
Domestic workers employed as private staff by diplomats or 
international civil servants remain one of the most “at risk” catego-
ries of domestic workers, with two factors combining to create a “spe-
cific protection gap”:2 the often “tied” nature of their immigration 
status and the potential immunity claim that may be submitted by a 
state invoking international law rules on state immunity or by a dip-
lomat invoking the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
(VCDR).3
Debates concerning whether or not international law rules can 
safeguard domestic workers in diplomatic households reflect the 
often gendered politics of jurisdictional conundrums in international 
law. Jurisdiction has been described as the “governance of legal gov-
ernance,” concerned primarily with questions of territory (where) and 
authority (who).4 Jurisdiction—understood as a peculiarly legal tech-
nology of governance—“also differentiates and organizes the ‘what’ of 
governance—and, most importantly because of its relative invisibil-
ity, the ‘how’ of governance.”5 The seeming legitimacy of jurisdictional 
limits applied to exclude domestic workers from rights, for example, 
can follow from a failure to question how the first-order determina-
tions of jurisdictional line-drawing were decided upon. Hiding behind 
such jurisdictional conundrums serves to deny the politics of decision 
making on how or whether to regulate employment in diplomatic 
households.
This Article examines the evolving laws of diplomatic and state 
immunity as they apply to the employment of domestic workers. 
It focuses, in particular, on evolving case law and legal standards 
in the United Kingdom and the United States. The picture that 
emerges from this examination is a fragmented one, suggesting 
1. See Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 Harv. L. rev. 4 (1983). The term “jurisgenerative” is used by Cover to 
describe the process through which legal meaning is created. Benhabib draws on 
the concept of the “jurisgenerative” to explore the expansion of human rights norms 
through international legal standards and their implementation in domestic laws. See 
SeyLa BenHaBIB, tHe rIgHtS of otHerS 181 (2004); SeyLa BenHaBIB, dIgnIty In adverSIty: 
Human rIgHtS In trouBLed tImeS (2011).
2. Gulnara Shahinian (Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, 
Including Its Causes and Consequences), Report to the Human Rights Council, 15th 
Sess., ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/20 (June 18, 2010).
3. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 14, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
A “private servant” is defined as “a person who is in the domestic service of a member 
of the mission and who is not an employee of the sending State.” Id. art. 1(h).
4. Mariana Valverde, Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal ‘Technicalities’ as Resources 
for Theory, 18 Soc. & LegaL Stud. 139, 141, 144 (2009).
5. Id. at 144.
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continuing uncertainty on the part of courts and tribunals when 
faced with diplomatic and state immunity claims. This fragmenta-
tion and, at times, dissonance go to the heart of competing views of 
the purpose of international law and its declared values. Workers 
seeking to vindicate rights that might otherwise be protected were 
their employers not shielded by the walls that surround diplomatic 
households have encountered significant difficulties in challeng-
ing immunity claims. Piercing the veil of jurisdictional immunities, 
even where a clear “inequality of arms” exists, has not proven easy, 
and, as yet, the transformative potential of evolving human rights 
and labor standards for domestic workers in such households has 
not been realized.
The case law and international legal standards examined here 
reveal a willingness to question and challenge the scope and purpose 
of immunity claims. What remains, however, is a tangled web of state 
and diplomatic immunity laws, subject to limited and often highly 
contested exceptions that pose significant difficulties for domestic 
workers seeking effective remedies for their claims.
I. SettIng tHe Scene: mIgrant domeStIc WorkerS  
accompanyIng dIpLomatS
As Aleinikoff notes, the migration process is built around a “tri-
angular relationship among a person, a sending state, and a receiving 
state.”6 The rights claims of domestic workers in diplomatic house-
holds, however, are frequently trumped by the more pressing interests 
of safeguarding good diplomatic relations between states. The “decent 
work deficit” experienced by domestic workers has increasingly come 
to the attention of international human rights bodies and regional 
and domestic courts.7 In respect of migrant domestic workers, their 
often precarious migration status and dependency (both de facto and 
de jure) on their employers adds further to the deficits in protection 
afforded by international labor and human rights standards.8 Recent 
standard-setting initiatives have attempted to address these gaps 
and have included the adoption of the landmark 2011 International 
Labour Organization (ILO) Convention Concerning Decent Work for 
6. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Legal Norms and Migration: A Report, 
in mIgratIon and InternatIonaL LegaL normS 1, 2–3 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent 
Chetail eds., 2003).
7. For commentary, see Virginia Mantouvalou, Servitude and Forced Labour in 
the 21st Century: The Human Rights of Domestic Workers, 35 InduS. L.J. 395 (2006); 
Siobhán Mullally & Clíodhna Murphy, Migrant Domestic Workers in the UK: Enacting 
Exclusions, Exemptions, and Rights, 36 Hum. rtS. Q. 397 (2014).
8. See, e.g., BrIdget anderSon, doIng tHe dIrty Work? tHe gLoBaL poLItIcS of 
domeStIc LaBour (2000); Bridget Anderson, A Very Private Business: Exploring the 
Demand for Migrant Domestic Workers, 14 eur. J. Women’S Stud. 247 (2007); Bridget 
Anderson, Migration, Immigration Controls and the Fashioning of Precarious Workers, 
24 Work emp. & Soc’y 300 (2010).
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Domestic Workers,9 a General Recommendation on Women Migrant 
Workers from the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW),10 and a General Comment on Migrant 
Domestic Workers from the UN Committee on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families—the 
first General Comment issued by this committee.11
The protection of the rights of domestic workers is a key site of 
conflict between international legal rules that regulate diplomatic 
relations between states and those regulating relationships between 
individuals (including migrant workers) and states. As presently 
defined, the intersection of the legal regulation of immigration with 
that of diplomatic relations molds domestic workers in diplomatic 
households into a position of subordination, a position that is anath-
ema to international human rights and labor standards. Of all the 
categories of migrant domestic workers, those employed in diplomatic 
households are most likely to be characterized as engaged in “unfree” 
work, constrained by immigration law on the one hand and laws of 
diplomatic and state immunity on the other.12 The protection theoret-
ically available to such workers continues to be hindered by the oper-
ation of law, with state interests in protecting the public sphere of 
international diplomacy shielding diplomats and states from account-
ability for what takes place in the private domain of the diplomatic 
household.
Information and statistics from specialized NGOs, as well as 
reported cases, confirm that the exploitation and abuse of domestic 
workers in diplomatic households is a real and ongoing problem.13 The 
precarious situation of such workers has been highlighted by a number 
of UN and international bodies, including the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Contemporary Forms of Slavery and the EU Fundamental Rights 
Agency.14 CEDAW in its General Recommendation on Women Migrant 
9. Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, I.L.O. Convention 
No. 189, June 16, 2011.
10. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
[CEDAW], General Recommendation No. 26 on Women Migrant Workers, Doc. No. 
CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R (Dec. 5, 2008).
11. Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families [Committee on Migrant Workers], General Comment No. 1 
on Migrant Domestic Workers, Doc. No. CMW/C/GC/1 (Feb. 23, 2011).
12. On the transition from “unfree” to “free” work for migrant domestic work-
ers generally, see anderSon, supra note 8, ch. 1 (in particular at 4). See also, gener-
ally, Fiona Williams, Review Article, Migration and Care: Themes, Concepts and 
Challenges, 9 Soc. poL’y & Soc’y 385 (2010).
13. See, e.g., Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating 
Trafficking in Human Beings Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
[OSCE], Unprotected Work, Invisible Exploitation: Trafficking for the Purpose of 
Domestic Servitude (OSCE Occasional Paper Series No. 4, 2010), http://www.osce.org/
secretariat/75804?download=true [hereinafter OSCE Occasional Paper No. 4].
14. See Shahinian, supra note 2; european unIon agency for fundamentaL rIgHtS, 
mIgrantS In an IrreguLar SItuatIon empLoyed In domeStIc Work: fundamentaL rIgHtS 
cHaLLengeS for tHe european unIon and ItS memBer StateS 17 (2011), http://fra.europa.eu/ 
sites/default/files/migrants_in_an_irregular_situation_employed_in_domestic_work_
en.pdf.
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Workers15 and the UN Committee on Migrant Workers in its General 
Comment on Migrant Domestic Workers16 have highlighted the par-
ticular obstacles faced by domestic workers in diplomatic households, 
in obtaining effective remedies for human rights violations.
In the United States, statements of interest submitted by the U.S. 
Department of State in the context of both state and diplomatic immu-
nity claims reflect an overriding concern to preserve friendly relations 
between nations. Deference is repeatedly paid to such claims, leaving 
domestic workers without recourse to legal remedies. For EU mem-
ber states and states parties to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR),17 both EU law and the ECHR have been found to be 
infringed in cases where domestic courts have upheld state immunity 
claims in the context of employment disputes. Diplomatic immunity 
afforded by domestic courts to serving diplomats also raises questions 
as to those states’ compliance with positive obligations of protection 
arising under Article 4 ECHR, which prohibits slavery, servitude, and 
forced or compulsory labor, and under international human rights 
standards. These positive obligations include the prevention, investi-
gation, and prosecution of serious forms of labor exploitation, and are 
linked to duties to ensure access to the courts (Article 6 ECHR) and 
to effective remedies for human rights violations (Article 13 ECHR), 
recognized also in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union.18
The UN Committee on Migrant Workers has called on states to 
ensure that migrant domestic workers can obtain legal redress and 
remedies, including from employers who enjoy diplomatic immu-
nity.19 In 2010, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants, reporting on his mission to the United Kingdom, specifi-
cally recommended that the U.K. government consider extending the 
right to change employer to domestic workers in diplomatic house-
holds as a safeguard against “abusive practices.”20
The 2014 Report of the U.K. Joint Committee on the Draft Modern 
Slavery Bill specifically recommended that the government consider 
issuing visas to domestic workers only where the contractual arrange-
ments are directly with an embassy or other diplomatic mission, rather 
15. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 26 on Women Migrant Workers, supra 
note 10, at ¶ 21.
16. Committee on Migrant Workers, General Comment No. 1 on Migrant Domestic 
Workers, supra note 11, at ¶ 18.
17. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
18. Consolidated Version of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 2.
19. Committee on Migrant Workers, General Comment No. 1 on Migrant Domestic 
Workers, supra note 11, at ¶ 49.
20. Jorge Bustamente (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants), 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants—Addendum: 
Mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 76(a), U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/14/30/Add.3 (Mar. 16, 2010).
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than with an individual diplomat.21 In response, the government ques-
tioned whether such a measure would provide additional safeguards 
to a domestic worker, given that a decision by a tribunal in favor of 
a worker could face difficulties of enforcement where an immunity 
claim is asserted by an embassy. No reference was made by the govern-
ment to obligations arising under either the ECHR or the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights to ensure access to the courts and to effective 
remedies. Neither was any reference made to the state’s obligations 
under international human rights treaty standards. The only reference 
to international legal obligations in the government’s response is found 
in its stated commitment to the VCDR and to ensuring compliance 
with employment laws, including by requesting waivers of immunity 
should immunity claims arise.22 An independent review of the United 
Kingdom’s Overseas Domestic Worker Visa, undertaken by James 
Ewins QC, recommended that the conditions of the sponsorship license 
be amended to require that overseas domestic workers in diplomatic 
households be employed by the embassy mission rather than by indi-
vidual diplomats.23 This recommendation reflects the evolution of the 
law of state immunity and greater recognition of the more limited scope 
of state immunity in disputes relating to employment contracts. In its 
response to the report, the government reiterated its earlier position, 
noted above, that such a reform would be unlikely to make a “material 
difference” to the government’s ability to check compliance, noting that 
the mission would enjoy state immunity. This response, however, fails 
to acknowledge the diverging practice on the scope of diplomatic and 
state immunity in such cases. A compromise position is taken in the 
2016 Tiers 2 and 5: Guidance for Sponsors document issued by U.K. 
Visas and Immigration (applicable to sponsors of private servants in 
diplomatic households), which provides that an application for a spon-
sor license amounts to an acknowledgment that a limited waiver of 
immunity or inviolability may be sought from the head of mission in 
order to undertake compliance activity relating to the license.24
The continuing nexus between abuse of domestic workers and the 
classical architecture of international law is manifested here in the 
law of diplomatic immunity. Domestic workers in diplomatic house-
holds continue to function in law’s shadows, dependent on ad-hoc 
21. JoInt commIttee on tHe draft modern SLavery BILL, draft modern SLavery 
BILL: report, 2013–14, HL Paper 166 & HC 1019, ¶ 228 (U.K.).
22. Sec’y of State for tHe Home dept., tHe government reSponSe to tHe report 
from tHe JoInt commIttee on tHe draft modern SLavery BILL, SeSSIon 2013–14 HL 
paper 166 / Hc 1019: draft modern SLavery BILL, 2014, Cm. 8889, at 28 (U.K.).
23. JameS eWInS, Independent revIeW of tHe overSeaS domeStIc WorkerS vISa 46 
(¶ 165.1) (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/486532/ODWV_Review_-_Final_Report__6_11_15_.pdf.
24. U.K. Visas & Immigration, Tiers 2 and 5: Guidance for Sponsors ¶ 4.20 
(TIER 5 (Temporary Worker) International Agreement) (Apr. 2016), https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/515819/
Tier_25_guidance_04-16_v1.2.pdf.
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measures of diplomacy to secure enforcement of rights claims. The 
expansion of decent work standards to domestic work may provide a 
corrective, as Blackett has suggested, to the “abstract articulations” of 
rights that traditionally overlook the exploitation of domestic work-
ers.25 The refusal on the part of some governments and employers to 
support this expansion of rights, however, continues to postpone a 
meaningful expansion of rights protections for diplomatic domestic 
workers in particular.
A. Denial of Redress: Implications of Diplomatic Immunity
Continued deference to the law of diplomatic immunity stems 
from the reciprocal benefits of compliance for states, which, as Rosalyn 
Higgins noted, are “visible and manifest.”26 The rationale for the 
granting of privileges and immunities to diplomats is outlined in the 
preamble to the VCDR, which states that it contributes “to the develop-
ment of friendly relations among nations, irrespective of their differing 
constitutional and social systems,”27 while also emphasizing that “the 
purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals 
but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic 
missions as representing States.” Article 31, the key provision in this 
respect, provides that diplomatic agents28 shall enjoy immunity from 
jurisdiction and from enforcement measures, with Article 31(1) setting 
out the principles of criminal immunity and qualified civil immunity.
The immunity of the diplomat is reinforced by Articles 29 and 
30, which render the diplomat’s person, private residence, papers and 
correspondence, and property inviolable. The diplomat’s family mem-
bers (spouse and minor children) who are living in the household are 
also extended immunity during the period of the diplomatic posting, 
pursuant to Article 37 of the VCDR.
Unfortunately, the immunity of diplomats in respect of relatively 
minor issues such as illegal parking has often received greater public 
attention than the abusive employment relationships of some diplo-
matic employers with their domestic workers.29 There are two signifi-
cant implications of Article 31 VCDR for domestic work, however. First, 
25. Adelle Blackett, Introduction: Regulating Decent Work for Domestic Workers, 
23 can. J. Women & L. 1, 44 (2011) (citing Adelle Blackett, Situated Reflections on 
International Labour Law, Capabilities, and Decent Work: The Case of Centre 
Maraîcher Eugène Guinois, revue QuéBécoISe de droIt InternatIonaL (SpecIaL ISSue) 
223, 242 (2007)).
26. Rosalyn Higgins, Editorial Comment, The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and 
Immunities: Recent United Kingdom Experience, 79 am. J. Int’L L. 641, 641 (1985).
27. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 3, pmbl.
28. Note that diplomats who are nationals or permanent residents of the host state 
have more limited immunity. They enjoy immunity from jurisdiction and inviolability 
only in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of their function. Id., art. 38(1)).
29. See Jonathan Brown, Diplomatic Immunity: State Practice Under the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 37 Int’L & comp. L.Q. 53 (1988); Mitchell S. Ross, 
Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity: A Review of Remedial Approaches to Address the 
Abuses of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 4 am. u. Int’L L. rev. 173 (1989).
684 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 64
absent a waiver by the sending state, the diplomat is immune from 
prosecution for offences involving trafficking, slavery, domestic servi-
tude or forced labour, where such offences exist in domestic law. These 
offences aim to deter and punish extreme forms of labour exploitation. 
Secondly, immunity from civil proceedings in employment law persists 
unless a claim can fit into one of the exceptions allowed for in Article 31.
Diplomatic immunity is extended to diplomats once they take up 
their post within the host state,30 and (pursuant to Article 39(2)) contin-
ues until a diplomat leaves the host state, except for acts performed by 
such a person in the exercise of his or her functions as a member of the 
mission; for those acts, immunity subsists.31 The extent of the residual 
immunity enjoyed by former diplomats has been explored in case law, 
and there is now greater willingness to limit the scope of such immu-
nity claims. Family members do not benefit from residual immunity.
Consular staff also benefit from immunity under the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations,32 though the immunity available 
is more limited and does not apply to civil actions which arise out of 
a contract entered into by a consular officer or employee that was not 
undertaken in his or her capacity as an agent of the sending state.33 
Certain categories of staff employed by international organizations 
also enjoy immunities and privileges.34
B.  Reinforcing Vulnerability: Informal Immigration Arrangements 
for Diplomatic Domestic Workers
Immigration arrangements relating to diplomatic domestic work-
ers are characterized by their relative informality. As a general rule, 
the special immigration status of domestic workers is dependent on 
the continuation of the employment relationship and their employ-
er’s stay in the host country, and therefore it does not allow them to 
switch their employer. This means that once the employment rela-
tionship has ended, the domestic worker loses her or his right to stay 
and work in the host state’s territory.35
30. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 3, art. 39(1).
31. Id. art. 39(2).
32. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 43(1), Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261.
33. Id. art. 43(2).
34. These are usually set out in the organization’s statutes or, where an interna-
tional organization is hosted by a particular country, in the headquarters agreement 
between the organization and the host country. The Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15, and 
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, Nov. 
21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 261, set out the privileges and immunities to which staff of the 
United Nations and its specialist agencies are entitled.
35. angeLIka kartuScH, german InSt. for Human rIgHtS, domeStIc WorkerS In 
dIpLomatS’ HouSeHoLdS: rIgHtS vIoLatIonS and acceSS to JuStIce In tHe context of 
dIpLomatIc ImmunIty 26 (2011).
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In a number of states, media and NGO commentary on the risks 
faced by domestic workers in diplomatic households has led to the 
introduction of mechanisms of control at the “entry” stage of the immi-
gration process. For example, Austria, Belgium, Germany, and France 
provide model contracts that are drafted in compliance with domestic 
labor law standards.36 Other states require that the employer sign 
a declaration, endorsed by the relevant embassy mission, confirming 
compliance with domestic labor law in the employment relationship, 
and further confirming that accommodation, health insurance, and a 
return flight at the end of the contract will be provided.37 In Austria, it 
must be shown that a bank account has been opened for the domestic 
worker, and in practice the protocol departments in France, Germany, 
and the Netherlands recommend the setting-up of bank accounts for 
domestic workers as an additional protective measure. Ministries of 
foreign affairs in certain jurisdictions hold interviews with domes-
tic workers employed in diplomatic households,38 a practice that has 
been welcomed in the Austrian context, for example, by the Council 
of Europe Group of Experts on Action Against Trafficking in Human 
Beings (GRETA).39 Ireland has traditionally provided a striking 
example of relative informality in the approach taken to the employ-
ment of domestic workers in diplomatic households.40 More recently, 
guidelines published by the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade have sought to remedy the gaps in protection arising in such 
contexts, and have clarified the application procedure for domestic 
workers employed by diplomats coming to Ireland.41 An undertaking 
36. See id. at 23.
37. Id. at 24. On reforms to improve the status of domestic workers in diplomatic 
households in the context of human trafficking, see generally Group of Experts on Action 
Against Trafficking in Human Beings [GRETA], Council of Europe, Report Concerning 
the Implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in 
Human Beings by Germany: First Evaluation Round, ¶¶ 120–21, Doc. No. GRETA(2015)10 
(June 3, 2015); GRETA, Council of Europe, Report Concerning the Implementation of the 
Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings by the 
Netherlands: First Evaluation Round, ¶ 143, Doc. No. GRETA(2014)10 (June 18, 2014).
38. Upon their arrival, workers in Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and (with some 
exceptions) France must attend the relevant government department unaccompanied to 
collect their identification card. See kartuScH, german InSt. for Human rIgHtS, supra note 
35, at 24. See also GRETA, Council of Europe, Report Concerning the Implementation 
of the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings by 
Belgium: First Evaluation Round, ¶ 127, Doc. No. GRETA(2013)14 (Sept. 25, 2013).
39. GRETA, Council of Europe, Report Concerning the Implementation of the 
Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings by 
Austria: First Evaluation Round, ¶ 73, Doc. No. GRETA(2011)10 (Sept. 15, 2011). 
See also GRETA, Council of Europe, Report Concerning the Implementation of the 
Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings by 
Austria: Second Evaluation Round, ¶ 196, Doc. No. GRETA(2015)19 (Oct. 12, 2015).
40. mIgrant rIgHtS centre IreLand, protectIng domeStIc WorkerS empLoyed By 
dIpLomatS In IreLand 2 (2011), http://mrci.ie/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Policy-Paper-
Diplomatic-Immunity-2011.pdf.
41. Ireland, Dept. of Foreign Affairs, Guidelines Relating to the Employment 
of Private Domestic Employees by Accredited Members of the Mission (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/newspress/publications/Guidelines-
on-the-Employment-of-Private-Domestic-Employees-by-Accredited-Members-of-the-
Mission-OCT15.pdf.
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to comply with agreed terms and conditions of employment must be 
signed prior to arrival. The domestic worker remains outside of nor-
mal immigration procedures, however, cannot change employer, and 
cannot access the social protection system. The high degree of infor-
mality in respect of the immigration status of diplomatic workers 
reinforces their invisibility.
In the United States, the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 introduced a series of preven-
tive measures following increasing political criticism of the failure to 
address incidents of trafficking by diplomats.42 The measures intro-
duced include the distribution of an education pamphlet for domes-
tic workers informing them of their rights and available supports; 
a prenotification requirement of visa application; a presumption of 
visa ineligibility unless the employer holds the diplomatic rank of 
minister (or equivalent), so as to ensure his or her ability to pay the 
legally required wages; and a requirement that wage payments be 
deposited into a bank account in the domestic worker’s name only. 
The prenotification requirement allows the U.S. State Department 
to maintain records of employment of domestic workers, and is also 
intended to ensure that chiefs of mission can be held accountable for 
the treatment of domestic workers.43 The education efforts are now 
to be supplemented with video materials for domestic workers to be 
shown in consular offices, as provided in the Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013.44 Additional references to states’ posi-
tive obligations to “appropriately address public allegations” against 
officials, including diplomats, once they return home are included in 
the 2013 act as indicia of “serious and sustained efforts” to eliminate 
severe forms of trafficking, and failure to meet such obligations is to 
be considered “inaction.”45
To date, the U.S. government’s efforts concerning trafficking in 
diplomatic households have tended to focus on prevention rather 
than on provision of effective remedies and access to compensation 
for the domestic worker.46 These efforts, Chuang argues, “are too weak 
to serve as the centerpiece of the U.S. government’s response to the 
problem of diplomatic trafficking,” especially in the absence of effec-
tive remedies or a willingness to invoke punitive measures against 
42. Pub. L. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. ch. 
78).
43. See u.S. dep’t of State, report to congreSS regardIng tHe “WILLIam WILBerforce 
traffIckIng vIctImS protectIon reautHorIzatIon act of 2008” 2–3 (2009), cited in Janie 
A. Chuang, Achieving Accountability for Migrant Domestic Worker Abuse, 88 N.C. L. 
rev. 1627, 1648 n.119 (2010).
44. Pub. L. 2013-4, sec. 1206, 127 Stat. 54, 140–41 (2013) (amending William 
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, § 292 (8 
U.S.C. § 1375b)).
45. Id. sec. 1204, 127 Stat. 54, 139 (amending Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
of 2000, § 108(b) (22 U.S.C. § 7106(b))).
46. See Chuang, supra note 43, at 1649.
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diplomatic missions that fail to ensure the adequate protection of 
domestic workers’ rights.47 Where sensitive or strategically important 
diplomatic ties are engaged, however, as in the case of Indian con-
sular official Devyani Khobragade,48 the political will to pursue the 
“inaction” of sending states is limited.49
Evolving “best practices” and bilateral initiatives may be useful 
in reducing the invisibility and isolation of domestic workers in diplo-
matic households.50 They signal an acknowledgment of the difficulties 
that can be encountered by such workers. However, in practice, it is 
difficult to monitor the effectiveness of these policies partly because 
they are, for the most part, set out in administrative circulars and 
diplomatic correspondence rather than in legally binding texts. 
Despite the expansion of such bilateral initiatives, avenues of redress 
for those who have endured abuse and exploitation remain limited.
Abuse of domestic workers in diplomatic households is all the 
more egregious given that migrant domestic workers are frequently 
reliant on consular services for support.51 The importance of effective 
access to such supports is noted by the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Human Rights of Migrants, François Crépeau, in his thematic 
report on the labor exploitation of migrants.52 Several governments 
have entered into bilateral agreements with receiving states in an 
effort to prevent abuses of migrant domestic workers and to over-
come the otherwise limited applicability of labor standards to diplo-
matic households.53 The advocacy of embassy officials is often crucial 
to ensuring that such agreements are effectively implemented. The 
necessity for such advocacy in the absence of effective safeguards 
for domestic workers is already recognized, for example, by the gov-
ernments of the Philippines and several other countries considered 
to be “labor-exporting.”54 The governments of the Philippines and 
Lebanon have negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding and 
47. Id.
48. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 82–86.
49. On the strategic importance of the United States–India diplomatic rela-
tionship, see BrookIngS InSt., tHe modI–oBama SummIt: a LeaderSHIp moment for 
IndIa and tHe unIted StateS (2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/flash-topics/
flash-topic-folder/us-india-modi-obama-summit.
50. For a discussion on such initiatives in Lebanon, see Gulnara Shahinian, 
Traditions, Law and Practice: Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon, in care, 
mIgratIon and Human rIgHtS: LaW and practIce 131 (Siobhán Mullally ed., 2015).
51. Ayesha Shahid, Migrant Filipino Domestic Workers in Pakistan: Agency, 
Rights and the Limits of the Law, in care, mIgratIon and Human rIgHtS: LaW and 
practIce, supra note 50, at 150, 170.
52. François Crépeau (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants), 
Labour Exploitation of Migrants, ¶ 99, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/35 (Apr. 3, 2014).
53. See Abdul Rehman, From Philippines to Pakistan: Maids Can Be Brought in 
for Only a Few Thousand Rupees, expreSS trIB. (Feb. 24, 2013), http://tribune.com.pk/
story/511766/from-philippines-to-pakistan-maids-can-be-brought-in-for-only-a-few-
thousand-rupees/.
54. See Nicole Constable, Obstacles to Claiming Rights: Migrant Domestic 
Workers in Asia’s World City, Hong Kong, in care, mIgratIon and Human rIgHtS: LaW 
and practIce, supra note 50, at 90.
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Protocol intended as a step towards lifting the restrictions on travel 
to Lebanon that were previously in place for migrant domestic work-
ers seeking employment.55
Such bilateral negotiations and agreements can serve to fill gaps 
in rights enforcement.56 However, as long as diplomatic households 
themselves continue to remain immune to scrutiny, efforts to support 
the enforcement of labor standards for migrant domestic workers 
can only be of limited impact. What is not clear in such cases is the 
outcome for the domestic worker as states resort to the traditions of 
“tit-for-tat” diplomatic disputes. Whether such responses meet states’ 
positive obligations on the right to effective access to legal remedies 
is increasingly open to question. Skepticism as to the political will 
to support implementation and greater compliance with labor and 
human rights standards persists in the absence of a commitment to 
extend scrutiny to the state’s own diplomatic missions.
II. “ImmunIty uSuaLLy entaILS ImpunIty”?57  
reSponSeS to ImmunIty cLaImS
A. Diplomatic Law Limits to Immunity
Suggestions to amend the VCDR in order to exclude diplomatic 
immunity for all offenses committed by diplomatic staff in private 
life58 or to provide for a human trafficking exception to immunity 
are unlikely to be taken on board. Nonetheless, as the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery has pointed out, where 
immunity is accepted by the receiving state and its courts, the receiv-
ing state still has a number of options open to it to secure remedies 
under the terms of the VCDR itself.59 Article 9 of the Convention pro-
vides that the receiving state may “at any time, and without having 
to explain its decision” declare any member of the diplomatic mis-
sion to be persona non grata and not accepted in the state. In those 
circumstances, the sending state must recall the person concerned or 
55. See Memorandum of Understanding on Labor Cooperation, Leb.–Phil., Feb. 1, 
2012, http://www.poea.gov.ph/laborinfo/bilateralLB/BLA_PH_Lebanon2012.pdf. The 
MOU and accompanying Protocol, however, have been described by Human Rights 
Watch as a “band-aid,” applicable only to a limited group of domestic workers and 
not addressing the systemic, structural problems in place. See Emma Gatten, MOU 
on Philippine Workers Won’t Resolve Key Problems: Rights Group, daILy Star (Feb. 4, 
2012), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Feb-04/162130-mou-on-
philippine-workers-wont-resolve-key-problems-rights-group.ashx.
56. See Marion Panizzon, Temporary Movement of Workers and Human Rights 
Protection: Interfacing the “Mode 4” of GATS with Non-Trade Bilateral Migration 
Agreements, 104 am. Soc’y Int’L L. proc. 131 (2010).
57. OSCE, supra note 13, at 27.
58. See, e.g., Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1523 
(2001): Domestic Slavery, ¶ 10.4.
59. The UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery recommended 
these courses of action for states in her report to the Human Rights Council. See 
Shahinian, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 57–58.
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terminate their functions within the mission. The U.K. Foreign Office, 
for example, has stated that a “serious view” is taken of any reliance on 
diplomatic immunity from civil jurisdiction to evade legal obligations.60
The receiving state can also request that the sending state waive 
the person’s immunity under Article 32 VCLT, invoking the duty of the 
member of the mission pursuant to Article 41 to respect the laws and 
regulations of the receiving state. In respect of domestic workers, the 
U.K. government stated in 2011 that the failure of a sending state to 
waive immunity “may result in a request to the mission for withdrawal 
of the diplomat.”61 However, it seems that as a matter of general practice 
in international relations, waivers of immunity are routinely requested 
but only occasionally granted.62 Finally, Article 31(4) provides that “the 
immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving 
State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending State,” 
and as such, the receiving state could request that the sending state 
take criminal or civil action (as appropriate) against the diplomat.
Thus while “legal means are at hand[,] . . . they need to be matched 
by political will.”63 There are ways in which states could minimize the 
impact of immunity on the rights of diplomatic domestic workers. 
However, such diplomatic maneuvers have been relatively ineffective 
to date.
B.  Continuing Invisibility: ILO Convention No. 189 Concerning  
Decent Work for Domestic Workers
The adoption of the 2011 ILO Convention No. 189 Concerning 
Decent Work for Domestic Workers64 represented a “landmark 
moment” for domestic workers. The reification (and exclusion) of the 
household was one of the key issues that emerged in debates leading 
up to the adoption of Convention No. 189. The 2011 Convention is the 
first international instrument dedicated to addressing the specificity 
of domestic work. It was welcomed as recognizing “for the first time 
in a holistic manner within a legal document”65 the working condi-
tions of domestic workers. As the report that preceded the Convention 
notes, it was intended to mark “a transition from the paternalistic 
conception of the ‘good employer’, acting out of a sense of noblesse 
oblige, to one that is founded on respect for domestic workers’ labour 
rights.”66 The Convention seeks to extend core decent work standards 
60. Foreign Office, Memorandum on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities in the 
United Kingdom, in U.K. Materials on Int’l L. [UKMIL], 1987 BrIt. y.B. Int’L L. 549.
61. See 727 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2011) col. WA 79.
62. See maLcoLm SHaW, InternatIonaL LaW 771 (7th ed. 2014).
63. Higgins, supra note 26, at 651.
64. Supra note 9.
65. Einat Albin & Virginia Mantouvalou, The ILO Convention on Domestic 
Workers: From the Shadows to the Light, 41 InduS. L.J. 67, 67 (2012). See also Adelle 
Blackett, The Decent Work for Domestic Workers Convention and Recommendation, 
2011, 106 am. J. Int’L L. 778 (2012).
66. InternatIonaL LaBour conference, 99tH SeSS., report Iv(1): decent Work for 
domeStIc WorkerS 13 (2011).
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concerning fair terms of employment and working conditions to the 
realm of domestic work. States are required to ensure that domestic 
workers enjoy equality with other workers with respect to working 
time,67 entitlements to minimum wage,68 healthy and safe working 
conditions,69 and social security protection (including with respect 
to maternity).70 It also requires states to introduce measures provid-
ing for the regulation of employment agencies71 and for effective and 
accessible dispute resolution mechanisms for domestic workers.72
In its submission to the ILO during the drafting process, the 
RESPECT network (a network of migrant domestic workers’ organi-
zations, trade unions, NGOs, and supporters that campaigns for the 
rights of migrant domestic workers in Europe and internationally) 
put forward seven key areas to be considered, including the position 
of domestic workers in diplomatic households.73 Despite the concerns 
raised, diplomatic immunity as an obstacle to securing decent work 
standards is not addressed in either the Convention or the accompa-
nying Recommendation.74 Domestic workers are treated for the most 
part as a homogeneous group and the particular circumstances of 
individual workers, including domestic workers in diplomatic house-
holds, have not been acknowledged.
C. Comparing State Practice on Diplomatic Immunity
There are documented examples of domestic workers employed 
by diplomats securing remedies against their former employers.75 
However, these examples generally arise from specific fact patterns or 
informal negotiation and settlement rather than from legal principle 
or certainty. In Ireland, France, and the United Kingdom, tribunals 
and courts have found themselves to be competent to hear cases, and 
have made awards to domestic workers in instances where the diplo-
mat employer did not acknowledge the proceedings or failed to take 
part, but did not claim immunity as such.76 However, such awards are 
often not then enforced, because immunity claims are triggered at the 
67. Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, supra note 9, art. 10.
68. Id. art. 11.
69. Id. art. 13.
70. Id. art. 14.
71. Id. art. 15(a).
72. Id. art. 16.
73. reSpect netWork, part 1—IntroductIon and key recommendatIonS for 
an ILo conventIon on domeStIc Work 4 (Key Recommendation no. 5) (May 2009), 
http://respectnetworkeu.org/data/documents/RESPECT-Recs-ILO-DW-Convention-
Questionaire-may-2009.pdf.
74. Int’l Labour Org., Gen. Conference, Recommendation No. 201 Concerning 
Decent Word for Domestic Workers, 100th Sess. (2011).
75. kartuScH, german InSt. for Human rIgHtS, supra note 35, at 33–35.
76. Id. at 33. In Ireland, the Employment Appeals Tribunal made an award of 
€80,000 ($88,500) to each of three migrant domestic workers employed by the United 
Arab Emirates ambassador to Ireland, who had been paid less than €2 per hour. 
Neither the ambassador nor his wife appeared at the tribunal hearing. See Calderon 
et al. v. Lootah and Alghubaisi, Case Nos. UD1219/2013, UD1220/2013, UD1221/2013 
(Emp’t Apps. Trib. Nov. 25, 2014) (Ir.). The French case is Conseil de Prud’hommes de 
Paris, Jan. 4, 2006, RG n° F 05/06486.
691DOUBLE JEOPARDY2016]
point of attempted enforcement77 or because of the departure of the 
diplomat from the receiving state.78 In France, the Conseil d’État has 
found that where the award cannot be enforced against the diplomat 
due to their immunity from enforcement measures, the French gov-
ernment may be liable for the worker’s compensation under the doc-
trine of state liability without negligence.79 Under this doctrine, the 
French state is liable in cases where an international treaty signed by 
France has an unintended significant negative effect upon a distinct 
group, such that the injury suffered can be considered both serious 
and exceptional. The relevant group for the purposes of the present 
discussion was defined by the Court as domestic workers employed by 
diplomats who had obtained a judgment of a French court that could 
not be enforced because of their employers’ immunity from measures 
of execution under the VCDR.
In the U.S. context, the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 offers some protection for 
trafficked domestic workers employed by diplomats. It authorizes 
the suspension of visa issuance to domestic workers seeking to work 
for an official in a diplomatic mission where there has been previ-
ous evidence of abuse by that official and where the abuse was toler-
ated by the mission.80 Domestic workers are also permitted to remain 
in the United States while they are seeking legal redress against 
employers.81
The dispute concerning the arrest in New York of the Indian 
Deputy Consul General accredited to the United States, Devyani 
Khobragade, by U.S. federal authorities, following charges of visa 
fraud and violations of employment laws, illustrates the legal con-
fusion that surrounds responses to abuses of consular or diplomatic 
privileges.82 In this case, the dispute took a number of diplomatic 
twists, including indictment by a federal grand jury, a refusal on the 
part of India to waive immunity, reassignment of Ms. Khobragade to 
77. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 3, art. 31(3).
78. In the French case referred to above, the award could not be enforced because 
of the diplomat’s immunity from measures of execution. In the United States, in the 
case of Mazengo v. Mzengi, 542 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2008), the award could not be 
enforced as the defendants left the United States. In the Irish case of Calderon et al., 
referred to supra note 76, the workers have received no compensation to date.
79. See CE 6th & 1st, Feb. 11, 2011, 325253.
80. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008 § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1375c(a); Chuang, supra note 43.
81. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008 § 203(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1375c(c); Chuang, supra note 43.
82. United States v. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The indict-
ment and associated materials are available at Indictment, Exhibits & Related 
Letter; U.S. v. Devyani Khobragade, u.S. dept. of JuStIce: u.S. att’y’S offIce—S. dISt. 
of n.y. (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/January14/
KhobragadeIndictment.php. Khobragade was indicted by a Grand Jury on January 9, 
2014, on two counts of visa fraud and making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2, 1001, and 1546. The domestic worker in this case, Sangeeta Richard, was sup-
ported by an NGO, Safe Horizon, in pursuing her claim.
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the Indian mission to the UN (in order to bring her within the scope 
of full diplomatic immunity rather than consular immunity only),83 
and, finally, her subsequent departure from the United States and 
reassignment to a post with the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi. 
Retaliatory measures followed on the part of India, all of which illus-
trates the range of sanctions that may be deployed when an employ-
ment dispute involving a diplomatic mission arises.84
U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin subsequently ruled that Ms. 
Khobragade enjoyed immunity at the time the indictment was issued 
(January 9, 2014), having been accredited as an Indian representa-
tive to the UN as of January 8. Section 11(a) of the 1946 Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations provides that 
“[r]epresentatives of Members to the principal and subsidiary organs 
of the United Nations and to conferences convened by the United 
Nations, shall, while exercising their functions . . . enjoy . . . [i]mmu-
nity from personal arrest or detention.”85 This immunity extends 
to legal processes, but only with respect to acts committed in their 
capacity as representatives of an international organization. Thus, 
it is functional immunity only, similar to that provided to consular 
officials. However, the inviolability of a representative to the UN is 
absolute.
Ms. Khobragade was re-indicted by a federal grand jury just two 
days after Judge Scheindlin’s ruling, on the ground that her immunity 
ceased following her departure from the United States and that, as 
such, she could no longer claim to benefit from its protection. Section 
11(a) of the 1946 Convention provides for immunity and inviolability 
only “while [representatives are] exercising their functions and dur-
ing the journey to and from the place of [conferences].”86 As of May 
2016, the indictment remains outstanding.
III. LItIgatIng empLoyment aBuSeS: LegaL proceedIngS taken By  
domeStIc WorkerS agaInSt dIpLomat empLoyerS
Despite the well-documented evidence of abuse, relatively few 
cases involving domestic workers seeking redress for abuse and 
83. This strategy follows from the headquarters agreement between the United 
Nations and the United States. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the 
United States Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations §§ 11, 15, June 26, 
1947, 61 Stat. 3416, 11 U.N.T.S. 11. See also The Practice of the United Nations, the 
Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency Concerning Their 
Status, Privileges and Immunities, [1967] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 154, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/L.118 and Add. l and 2.
84. Dapo Akande, The Immunity of Representatives to the UN: A New Twist in the 
Diplomatic Row Between India and the United States, eJIL: taLk!—BLog of tHe eur. 
J. Int’L L. (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-immunity-of-representatives-to-
the-un-a-new-twist-in-the-diplomatic-row-between-india-and-the-united-states/.
85. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra 
note 34, art. IV, § 11(a).
86. Id.
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exploitation by employers with diplomatic immunity are ever heard by 
courts or tribunals. Diplomatic domestic workers face structural bar-
riers to bringing these claims, such as isolation within the diplomatic 
home, language difficulties, and the lack of a secure migration status 
independent of the employer.87 Where such cases come before a court 
or tribunal, the primary difficulty faced by the litigant is the immunity 
of the diplomatic employer. The cases have concerned the interpreta-
tion of the commercial activity exception, residual immunity and, in 
the United States, civil suits for trafficking and forced labor. There are 
three principal objections to the application of the law of immunity in 
these cases. First, the current interpretation of the commercial activ-
ity exception leaves domestic workers with no civil means of redress 
for employment violations while the diplomat remains in their offi-
cial post. Second, the approach taken in the residual immunity cases 
focuses on whether the acts carried out by the diplomatic employer 
were performed in the course of their official functions, thus taking 
the spotlight away from the individual rights violations at issue. Both 
of these factors collide with the workers’ right of access to the courts. 
Third, immunity from criminal prosecution for diplomats may conflict 
with states’ obligations in respect of the criminalization and effective 
prevention of trafficking, slavery, servitude, and forced labor.
A.  Wokuri v. Kassam and Abusabib v. Taddese: Pursuing an  
Employment Claim in the United Kingdom
In Wokuri v. Kassam,88 the scope of diplomatic immunity was 
examined in the U.K. courts when a domestic worker submitted a 
claim before an employment tribunal, stating that her diplomat 
employer had failed to provide her with a copy of her contract as 
required by law and had failed to pay her wages in full. The claim-
ant, Ms. Wokuri, was employed as a chef and general domestic worker 
for the respondent, Ms. Kassam, a diplomat in the Ugandan High 
Commission in London. The respondent left the United Kingdom for 
the Rome mission in 2011, meaning that, in addition to the Article 
31(1) commercial activities exception, Article 39(2) of the VCDR on 
residual immunity was also applicable in this case.89
The High Court’s decision thus centered on the assessment of 
whether the claim arose from acts performed in the exercise of the 
defendant’s official functions. Ms. Kassam argued that the claimant 
was employed directly by the High Commission and that even if she 
had employed the claimant personally, she did so in the exercise of her 
87. u.n. offIce of tHe HIgH commISSIoner for Human rIgHtS, regIonaL offIce for 
europe, rIgHtS of mIgrant domeStIc WorkerS In europe 4 (2010), http://www.europe.
ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Study_Domestic_Migrant_webversion.pdf.
88. [2012] EWHC 105.
89. Id. [9]–[10]; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 3, arts. 
31(1), 39(2).
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functions as a diplomat in the High Commission and so in either case 
was entitled to diplomatic immunity.90 However, the court accepted 
that Ms. Wokuri had worked for Ms. Kassam in Uganda for several 
years before Ms. Kassam became a diplomat, therefore this contract 
was not entered into in the exercise of her functions as a diplomat. 
There was no evidence that any changes were made to this con-
tract when Ms. Wokuri came to the United Kingdom to work for Ms. 
Kassam, nor was there any evidence that she worked directly for the 
High Commission.91 In arguing that receiving domestic help was of 
vital importance to her work as a diplomat,92 Ms. Kassam referred to 
a circular issued by the Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which, in 
the interests of promoting “conducive working conditions” in its over-
seas missions, allowed for the provision of a housekeeper/cook to each 
appointed Deputy Head of Mission at their residence, to be paid by the 
mission. In spite of this arrangement, the court considered that the 
provision of a housekeeper or cook was of indirect rather than direct 
benefit to diplomatic functions. Diplomatic immunity did not apply, as 
the claim did not arise out of acts performed in the exercise of the 
respondent’s functions as a diplomat in the High Commission.93
In arriving at its decision in Wokuri, the court observed that 
there were no U.K. authorities on the issue being considered and 
referred to three U.S. cases involving domestic workers employed 
by diplomats: Tabion v. Mufti,94 Swarna v. Al-Awadi,95 and Baoanan 
v. Baja, discussed below.96 These cases were drawn upon again by 
the U.K. Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) in the case of Abusabib 
v. Taddese,97 in which the focus was once more on the functional test 
set out in Article 31(1)(c). The EAT went a step further than the High 
Court had in Wokuri, expressing the view that there was “little scope 
for the act of employing a domestic servant to be part of the function 
of the diplomat in his mission.”98 It acknowledged that there is a “spec-
trum”99 between the employment of a domestic worker who performs 
no work outside the diplomat’s home (which was seen as “unlikely to 
be an act performed in the exercise of the functions as such”),100 and a 
personal assistant whose job is “replying to correspondence” and “man-
aging the diary, travel arrangements and the like of the diplomat.”101 
The EAT recognized that in less clear-cut cases along the spectrum 
90. Wokuri, [2012] EWHC 105, [3].
91. Id. [27] (point (iii)).
92. Id. [27] (point (iv)).
93. Id. [27] (point (v)).
94. 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996).
95. 622 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
96. 627 F. Supp. 2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
97. [2013] All ER (D) 121 (Mar), UK EAT App. No. UKEAT/0424/11/ZT (Dec. 20, 
2012).
98. Id. [29].
99. Id. [31].
100. Id.
101. Id.
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between these two situations, it may “be difficult to see where the 
dividing line between the functions of the mission, and other func-
tions might fall.”102 In this case, taken on the grounds of direct race 
discrimination and harassment, harassment on the basis of religion, 
and sexual harassment, neither the domestic worker’s employment 
nor the acts complained of arose from the exercise of the appellant’s 
diplomatic functions, and thus residual immunity did not apply. The 
EAT noted that “[i]t cannot be said that an act of racial or sexual dis-
crimination . . . could be regarded as any part of, or ancillary to any 
part of, the functions of a diplomat as a member of a mission.”103
B.  Tabion v. Mufti and U.S. Case Law: Domestic Work as Incidental 
to the Daily Life of Diplomats?
The case of Tabion v. Mufti104 centered on Article 31(1)(c) VCDR, 
the commercial activity exception. The case concerned a Jordanian 
diplomat, who had retained the applicant’s passport and forced her 
to work for sixteen hours per day and for fifty cents an hour (with no 
overtime pay). The respondent had threatened her with termination, 
deportation, and arrest if she left the residence. When the respon-
dent, Mr. Mufti, claimed diplomatic immunity, the plaintiff argued 
that the commercial activity exception applied. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the commercial activ-
ity exception was intended to encompass “trade or business activity 
engaged in for personal profit.”105 The court followed the “negotiating 
history” approach set out in the U.S. Department of State’s Statement 
of Interest in the case, coming to the conclusion that the exception 
“focuses on the pursuit of trade or business activity” and “does not 
encompass contractual relationships for goods and services incidental 
to the daily life of the diplomat and family in the receiving State.”106 
As the exception was held not to apply, the diplomat’s immunity was 
recognized and the motion was therefore quashed.
As well as being endorsed in the United Kingdom in Wokuri 
v. Kassam,107 this approach was followed in subsequent U.S. cases, 
including Gonzales Paredes v. Vila108 and Montuya v. Chedid,109 which 
(like Tabion) ended in the dismissal of civil suits against sitting dip-
lomats by former domestic workers on the grounds of immunity.110 
In Gonzales Paredes, the Court found that the Statement of Interest 
102. Id.
103. Id. [28].
104. 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996).
105. Id. at 537.
106. Id. at 538 (quoting the Statement of Interest filed by the Department of 
State).
107. [2012] EWHC 105.
108. 479 F. Supp. 2d 187, 189–90 (D.D.C. 2007).
109. 779 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2011).
110. See also Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224 (D.L.C.), 2002 WL 1964806 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 23, 2002) (also dismissed on the grounds of diplomatic immunity).
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filed by the U.S. Department of State, “while not dispositive, is enti-
tled to great deference”;111 it decided that there was “no reason to dis-
agree with the conclusion of the Department of State—and the Fourth 
Circuit—that a contract for domestic services such as the one at issue 
in this case is not itself a ‘commercial activity’ within the meaning of 
Article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.”112 
The court rejected what it called the “creative”113 argument that the 
domestic work performed by the plaintiff had allowed the diplomat to 
pursue academic studies, which constituted a “professional activity” 
outside his official functions within the meaning of Article 39(2).114
Attempts to expand the commercial activities exception in the United 
States have been unsuccessful. In Montuya v. Chedid,115 the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia rejected the argument that it should 
consider the case law interpreting the term “commercial activity” under 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,116 as that Act was not a multilat-
eral treaty, it was enacted after the VCDR, and it was not intended that it 
would change the meaning of existing international treaties. In Sabbithi 
v. Al Saleh117 and Swarna v. Al-Awadi,118 discussed below, the plaintiffs 
and amici curiae argued that trafficking was “commercial activity exer-
cised by the diplomatic agent . . . outside his official functions” as human 
trafficking is a profitable commercial activity that results in severe 
human rights violations.119 This argument was rejected in both cases, 
with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 
Sabbithi instead reaffirming the Tabion and Gonzales Paredes decisions 
that “such a literal manner of interpretation is superficial and incomplete, 
and, [this Court] believe[s], yields an incorrect rendering of the meaning 
of ‘commercial activity’ as used in the Vienna Convention.”120 It refused to 
interpret the VCDR in light of other elements of international law, most 
particularly human rights protections.
The employment relationship between a diplomat and their 
“private servant” (to use the terminology of the VCDR)121 is thus 
111. Gonzales Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 194.
114. Id.
115. Montuya, 779 F. Supp. 2d 60 (granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff ’s complaint).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq.
117. 605 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C 2009).
118. 622 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
119. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Sabbithi, 605 
F. Supp. 2d 122, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153562.pdf; Second 
Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Sabbithi, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/179265.pdf; Brief for the United States 
of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Swarna, 622 F.3d 123, http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/179267.pdf.
120. Sabbithi, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 127 (citing Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 537 (4th 
Cir. 1996)) (alterations in original).
121. A “private servant” is defined as a “person who is in the domestic service of 
a member of the mission and who is not an employee of the sending State.” Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 3, art. 1(h).
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not generally interpreted as involving any element of “professional 
or commercial activities.”122 Diplomatic employers are consequently 
immune from employment litigation brought by their domestic work-
ers. This interpretive approach reflects the classic difficulty encoun-
tered by domestic workers seeking to enforce their rights: the lack of 
recognition of the economic value of their work and the consequent 
confinement of the employment relationship to the seemingly impreg-
nable “private sphere.” This also gives rise to the paradoxical situa-
tion that the indispensable nature of the day-to-day work provided by 
domestic workers results in a lower level of protection for their rights.
The Tabion line of case law enshrines a narrow approach to the 
interpretation of the VCDR which appears to be directly based on 
the U.S. government’s views as set out in the relevant Statements 
of Interest. The Court of Appeals in Tabion was heavily influenced 
by the reciprocity approach underlying the perception of diplomatic 
immunity as a fundamental rule of diplomatic law, and the deference 
of the court to the executive branch of government in matters of for-
eign policy is clear in the following quote: “Policymakers in Congress 
and the Executive Branch . . . have determined that apparent ineq-
uity to a private individual is outweighed by the great injury to the 
public that would arise from permitting suit against the entity or its 
agents calling for application of immunity.”123
Notwithstanding this reasoning, there are strong arguments in 
favor of taking a different interpretive approach to Article 31.124 In 
particular, developments in the sphere of state immunity have recog-
nized limits to the doctrine in the context of employment disputes. In 
the cases of Cudak v. Lithuania125 and Sabeh El Leil v. France126 (dis-
cussed below), the European Court of Human Rights has found that 
the application of state immunity in an employment dispute involv-
ing embassy employees constituted a violation of Article 6(1) ECHR, 
which provides inter alia for a right of access to a hearing by a tribu-
nal in the determination of civil rights and obligations.127
C. Residual Diplomatic Immunity in the U.S. Courts
Despite the non-applicability of the commercial activity exception 
to the domestic worker employment relationship, two further U.S. cases, 
which were relied on by the U.K. High Court in Wokuri, confirmed the 
122. kartuScH, german InSt. for Human rIgHtS, supra note 35, at 16.
123. Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 539 (1996).
124. See the arguments of Amy Tai, Unlocking the Doors to Justice: Protecting the 
Rights and Remedies of Domestic Workers in the Face of Diplomatic Immunity, 17 am. 
u. J. gender, Soc. poL’y & L. 175 (2007).
125. Cudak v. Lithuania, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 153.
126. Sabeh El Leil v. France, App. No. 34869/05 (June 19, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-105378.
127. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
supra note 17, art. 6(1).
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narrow limitation on immunity for claims brought by domestic work-
ers against former diplomats. This limitation draws upon Article 39(2) 
VCDR which, as mentioned above, provides for residual immunity to a 
diplomat who is no longer in post, but only for “acts performed by such 
a person in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission.”128 
The lifting of immunity in these cases depends on a determination of 
whether the employment of the worker and the conduct of the employer 
constituted an official act. In Swarna v. Al-Awadi,129 the plaintiff, Ms. 
Swarna, was promised $2,000 a month with Sundays off and one month 
of paid vacation per year to visit her family in India. However, when 
she arrived in the United States, the diplomat (Mr. Al-Awadi) retained 
her passport, forced her to work very long hours, and paid her only 
$200–$300 per month. She was also physically abused and raped by 
the diplomat. On considering all the facts, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit considered that residual immunity did not apply in this 
case, as Mr. Al-Awadi’s employment of the plaintiff was not an act per-
formed by the diplomat in the exercise of his functions as a member of 
the mission. The plaintiff was employed to meet Mr. Al-Awadi’s private 
needs and although she cooked at official functions on occasion, this 
was incidental to her regular employment.130 She won a default judg-
ment in the District Court (as the diplomat had already left the coun-
try) for her labor law claims relating to non-payment of minimum wage 
and overtime, and under the Alien Tort Claims Act131 for her claims 
relating to “trafficking, involuntary servitude, forced labor, assault, and 
sexual abuse.”132 While the Court of Appeals vacated the default judg-
ment, it affirmed the substantive findings of the District Court in rela-
tion to diplomatic immunity.
Baoanan v. Baja133 concerned a claim brought by a domestic 
worker alleging that she was forced to work for Mr. Baja, a diplomat, 
and his family in circumstances where she thought that she was com-
ing to the United States to look for a nursing position. When Article 
39(2) of the Vienna Convention dealing with residual immunity was 
invoked, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
distinguished between domestic workers hired by the mission itself 
to perform domestic tasks and those employed in a private capac-
ity to undertake tasks of a private or personal nature. It noted that 
“[a] diplomat could employ and pay staff to perform personal or pri-
vate tasks for the diplomat or the diplomat’s family that the send-
ing State would not recognize as ordinary or necessary to the official 
128. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 3, art. 39(2).
129. 622 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
130. This approach follows Park v. Shin, 313 F.3d 1138, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2002).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
132. 622 F.3d at 127. The plaintiff ’s initial claim was dismissed without prejudice, 
as at the time of the filing of the suit Al-Awadi was still employed by the Kuwaiti 
mission, with the judge specifically referring to the possibility of bringing a fresh suit 
when he was no longer with the mission.
133. 627 F. Supp. 2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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functioning of the mission and for which it would not provide compen-
sation.”134 The court held that, as in this case the plaintiff ’s employ-
ment as a domestic worker served the defendant’s private needs and 
only very indirectly benefited the diplomatic mission, residual diplo-
matic immunity did not apply and the case could proceed.
There is an apparent contradiction in the way in which the work 
is characterized in Tabion v. Mufti and the residual immunity cases. 
The Tabion approach relies on the presumption that “[d]ay-to-day liv-
ing services such as dry cleaning or domestic help were not meant to 
be treated as outside of a diplomat’s official functions.”135 The residual 
immunity cases, on the other hand, are based on classifying this work 
precisely as falling outside of the official functions of the diplomat. 
Thus, while the development of a narrow “exception” for the actions of 
former diplomats is welcome from a rights-protection perspective, the 
case law in respect of diplomatic immunity is not internally coherent.
The right of access to the courts and to an effective legal remedy 
continues to pose a challenge to the kind of jurisdictional “chain-reac-
tion” that has historically followed from both diplomatic and state 
immunity claims. As we shall see, in the realm of state immunity 
claims, it is possible to point to a progress narrative, albeit one that 
remains contested.
Iv. effectIve remedIeS and JurISdIctIonaL ImmunItIeS:  
gendered proceSSeS of LIne draWIng
A. Access to Courts, Effective Remedies, and State Immunity
While the European Court of Human Rights has not yet been 
called upon to adjudicate a conflict between diplomatic immunity and 
abuse in the case of migrant domestic workers, it has considered the 
interaction of state immunity and rights violations through the prism 
of Article 6(1) ECHR. The Court’s judgments in Fogarty v. United 
Kingdom,136 which concerned a sex discrimination claim taken 
against the U.S. embassy in the United Kingdom, and McElhinney 
v. Ireland,137 regarding a claim for personal injuries against the 
United Kingdom for acts committed in Ireland, were handed down on 
the same day. Illustrating the difficulties involved in seeking to dis-
lodge immunity claims, neither of the applicants were successful in 
arguing that the application of state immunity in these cases violated 
Article 6 ECHR.
134. Id. at 165.
135. Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 538–39 (1996).
136. 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 157 (extracts), full judgment available at http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59886.
137. 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37 (extracts), full judgment available at http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59887.
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In Fogarty, the Court rejected the applicant’s argument (among 
others made by her) that the application of state immunity was a dis-
proportionate limitation on the right of access to the courts as the 
United Kingdom was not obliged under international law to grant 
immunity in respect of her claim, due to the tendency in international 
law towards restricting the scope of state immunity. While the Court 
recognized this tendency, it found that international practice was still 
divided on the question of whether and in what circumstances state 
immunity continued to apply to employment-related disputes in a for-
eign mission or embassy.138 It pointed out that this case concerned the 
sensitive area of discrimination in the recruitment process and that 
there was no consensus in relation to the recruitment stage of the 
employment relationship, stating that it was “not aware of any trend 
in international law towards a relaxation of the rule of state immunity 
as regards issues of recruitment to foreign missions.”139 The Court’s 
decision was adopted with only one dissenting judgment.140 Similarly, 
the applicant in McElhinney was unsuccessful in his argument that 
the immunity afforded to the U.K. government should not have been 
granted, as most states had changed their sovereign immunity rules 
to permit actions for personal injuries inflicted in the forum state. 
The Court found, in a majority decision of 12–5, that the practice of 
limiting state immunity in respect of personal injury caused by an act 
or omission within the forum state was “by no means universal.”141
In neither of these cases did the Court explore in detail the argu-
ment that the international law of immunity had to be reconciled 
with human rights guarantees. In both judgments, the Court was 
content to point out:
Just as the right of access to courts is an inherent part of 
the fair trial guarantee in that Article [6(1) ECHR], so some 
restrictions on access must likewise be regarded as inher-
ent, an example being those limitations generally accepted 
by the community of nations as part of the doctrine of State 
immunity.142
These judgments were handed down over a decade ago. More recent 
case law of the Strasbourg Court, in particular the decisions of the 
Court in Cudak v. Lithuania143 and Sabeh El Leil v. France,144 indi-
cates a subsequent evolution of international law in relation to state 
immunity. Cudak v. Lithuania concerned an applicant who had been 
dismissed from her secretarial role in the Polish embassy as a result 
138. Fogarty, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 166–67 (¶ 37).
139. Id. at 167 (¶ 38).
140. The dissenting judgment was by Justice Loucaides. In addition, Justices 
Caflisch, Costa, and Vajić together issued a separate opinion concurring in the result.
141. McElhinney, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 46 (¶ 38).
142. Id. ¶ 37; Fogarty, ¶ 36.
143. 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 153.
144. App. No. 34869/05 (June 19, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105378.
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of events transpiring from a sexual harassment complaint she had 
lodged with the relevant ombudsman in Lithuania (which had been 
upheld). The evolution of customary international law before and 
since the decision in Fogarty was expressly referred to by the Court in 
Cudak, with the Court noting “that there was a trend in international 
and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of 
employment-related disputes, with the exception, however, of those 
concerning the recruitment of staff in embassies.”145 The Court went 
on to find that, in this regard, “the application of absolute State 
immunity has, for many years, clearly been eroded.”146
The Court repeated its finding in Fogarty that the restriction on 
access to the courts in state immunity cases “pursues the legitimate 
aim of complying with international law to promote comity and good 
relations between States through the respect of another State’s sov-
ereignty.”147 However, the interference here was disproportionate as 
it was not required by international law, and neither the secretarial 
duties performed by the applicant nor the acts of sexual harassment 
complained of could be “regarded as undermining Poland’s secu-
rity interests.”148 The Court found that customary international law, 
reflecting Article 11 of the 2004 UN Convention on the Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property,149 contains an exception to 
state immunity in respect of employment contracts for staff of a state’s 
diplomatic missions abroad. This exception applies generally, aside 
from a limited number of situations as set out in Article 11(2). These 
include: where the person has been recruited to perform particular 
functions in the exercise of governmental authority; where the subject 
matter of the proceeding is the recruitment, renewal of employment, 
or reinstatement of an individual; where the employee is a national of 
the employer state; and where the subject matter of the proceeding is 
the dismissal or termination of employment of an individual and, as 
determined by the head of state, the head of government, or the minis-
ter of foreign affairs of the employer state, the proceeding would inter-
fere with the security interests of that state. In finding that Article 11 
of the 2004 UN Convention forms part of customary international law, 
the Court referred to the work of the International Law Commission 
in codifying and developing the law in this area, the 1991 Draft 
Articles,150 and the 2004 Convention itself (the text of which is based 
upon the Draft Articles and the deliberations of the Commission).151 
145. Cudak, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 175 (¶ 63).
146. Id. at 175 (¶ 64).
147. Id. at 175 (¶ 60); Fogarty, ¶ 34.
148. Cudak, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 177–78 (¶ 72).
149. G.A. Res. 59/38, annex, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc., A/59/49 
(Dec. 16, 2004) (not yet in force).
150. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and 
Their Property, [1991] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2218–SR.2221 
[hereinafter ILC Draft Articles].
151. U.N. Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property, supra note 149.
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The Court in Cudak also pointed out that Fogarty could be distin-
guished on the basis that it concerned the issue of recruitment (which 
would fall under the Article 11(2) exceptions of the 2004 Convention in 
any event).152
In Sabeh El Leil v. France,153 which concerned an unfair dis-
missal claim brought by a former accountant and head accountant 
of the Kuwaiti embassy in France, the Grand Chamber followed the 
approach taken in Cudak. The Court unanimously found that the 
French courts had not correctly applied the international law of state 
immunity, as reflected in the provisions of the 2004 Convention and 
customary international law. The Court repeated its finding in Cudak 
that the application of absolute state immunity had been eroded,154 in 
particular given the adoption of the 2004 UN Convention.
On the customary international law point, the European Court 
of Human Rights in Sabeh El Leil reiterated, without any analy-
sis, its finding in Cudak that Article 11 of the UN Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property “applies 
under customary international law, even if the State in question has 
not ratified that convention, provided it has not opposed it either.”155 
Bederman has criticized the Court’s approach because, among other 
reasons, the 2004 Convention has not come into force and the sta-
tus of its rules as part of customary international law is doubtful.156 
However, to reinforce its conclusions, the Court stated that this find-
ing was confirmed in French domestic law, because “[i]n its case-law 
the [French] Court of Cassation refuses to apply jurisdictional immu-
nity in an absolute manner, taking the view that it is not applicable 
in the context of a dispute concerning an embassy employee who has 
no particular responsibility in the exercise of the public diplomatic 
service.”157
Article 11 of the 2004 Convention was thus applicable as forming 
part of customary law, and none of the Article 11(2) exceptions applied 
to the applicant. The European Court criticized the French domestic 
courts for assuming that additional responsibilities taken on by the 
applicant and his (limited) degree of autonomy meant that he “par-
ticipated in acts of governmental authority of the State of Kuwait,”158 
without any objective evidence or justification for this conclusion.159
Rather than focusing on the applicant’s argument that the 
approach of the French courts was flawed because his claim was 
152. Cudak, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 175 (¶ 62).
153. Sabeh El Leil v. France, App. No. 34869/05 (June 19, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-105378.
154. Id. ¶ 53.
155. Id. ¶ 54.
156. David J. Bederman, Sabeh El Leil v. France, 106 am. J. Int’L L. 125 (2012).
157. Sabeh El Leil, App. No. 34869/05, ¶ 59.
158. Id. ¶ 63.
159. Id. ¶¶ 63–65.
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in the nature of an allegation of a human rights violation, the rea-
soning in Sabeh El Leil turned on the interpretation of the express 
provisions of the 2004 Convention, much as it had in Cudak. The 
applicability of this reasoning to cases involving diplomatic immu-
nity is thus doubtful. As is clear from the analysis above, the VCDR, 
unlike the 2004 Convention, does not contain a specific exception 
to immunity in proceedings relating to employment contracts. As 
seen in the U.S. context in Montuya v. Chedid, mentioned earlier, 
it seems that courts will be reluctant to apply the approach taken 
to state immunity in the interpretation of the limits of diplomatic 
immunity.
The Grand Chamber in Sabeh El Leil did emphasize that the 
ECHR is intended to guarantee rights that are not merely theoreti-
cal or illusory, but practical and effective, and stated that it would 
be inconsistent with the rule of law in a democratic society if states 
were able to remove a whole range of civil claims from the jurisdic-
tion of the courts without any restraint or control by Convention 
bodies.160 Overall, the Court concluded that in upholding the state 
immunity claim and dismissing the applicant’s claim without provid-
ing relevant and sufficient reasons, “the French courts [had] failed 
to preserve a reasonable relationship of proportionality.”161 They had 
consequently “impaired the very essence of the applicant’s right of 
access to a court.”162
These cases reflect the view of the Court that the rationale 
underpinning state immunity laws is less compelling in the context of 
employment-related disputes. In both Cudak and Sabeh El Leil, the 
Court indicated that the state must show a reasonable basis for con-
cluding that one of the Article 11(2) exceptions applied on the facts of 
the case. The Court requires evidence, therefore, that the duties of the 
person or the acts complained of “related to the sovereign interests” of 
the state.163
The approach of the Strasbourg Court, drawing on expressly 
stated narrow exceptions to state immunity, is similar to that followed 
by the U.K. Employment Appeal Tribunal in Nigeria v. Ogbonna,164 
where the tribunal was called upon to interpret the scope of permis-
sible exceptions in the State Immunity Act 1978.165 The applicant had 
argued that her employer (the Republic of Nigeria) had unlawfully 
discriminated against her on the ground of her daughter’s disability 
and that her treatment had affected her physical and mental health. 
The EAT confirmed that the exception to state immunity for contracts 
160. Id. ¶ 50.
161. Id. ¶ 67.
162. Id. ¶ 57.
163. Id. ¶ 62.
164. [2011] All ER (D) 19 (Oct), UK EAT App. No. UKEAT/585/10 (July 12, 2011).
165. 1978, c. 33 (U.K.).
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of employment provided for in section 4 of the Act did not apply 
because the applicant was a member of the mission and the claim was 
therefore excluded under section 16(1) of the same Act.166 However, in 
respect of state immunity for personal injury proceedings, the general 
exception for acts which had taken place in the United Kingdom was 
a freestanding exception.167 For this reason, among others, the State 
of Nigeria was not immune and the tribunal had jurisdiction to hear 
the claim.
Neither this decision, nor the exception in section 4 of the State 
Immunity Act 1978 for employment-related cases, was referred to 
in the later diplomatic immunity cases of Wokuri v. Kassam168 or 
Abusabib v. Taddese,169 illustrating the separateness of the state 
immunity and diplomatic immunity regimes. The current differing 
interpretations of the exceptions to state immunity and diplomatic 
immunity introduce an anomaly whereby if a domestic worker’s 
employment contract is with the foreign state, that state will not be 
able to claim immunity in respect of matters arising from the employ-
ment contract, whereas if the contract is with the diplomat in their 
individual capacity, immunity will generally apply and the worker 
will be blocked from obtaining redress.
In Benkharbouche v. Embassy of the Republic of Sudan,170 the 
Court of Appeal of England and Wales declared sections 4(2)(b) 
and 16(1)(a) of the United Kingdom’s State Immunity Act 1978 
to be incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR in its application to 
the claims in dispute in this case. The case concerned two Moroccan 
domestic workers, Ms. Benkharbouche and Ms. Janah, employed by 
the embassies of Sudan and Libya who brought a series of claims to 
the Employment Appeal Tribunal following their dismissals from 
employment. Both embassies invoked state immunity, relying on the 
U.K. State Immunity Act.
On the potential conflict with Article 6 ECHR, the Court of 
Appeal noted the finding of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Jones v. United Kingdom,171 that “states enjoy a margin of apprecia-
tion in relation to limiting access to courts,”172 and that the grant of 
166. Section 4(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978 provides: “A State is not immune 
as respects proceedings relating to a contract of employment between the State and 
an individual where the contract was made in the United Kingdom or the work is to 
be wholly or partly performed there,” but section 16(1) provides for an exclusion from 
section 4 in the case of members of the mission.
167. Ogbonna, UK EAT App. No. UKEAT/585/10, ¶ 12.
168. [2012] EWHC 105.
169. [2013] All ER (D) 121 (Mar), UK EAT App. No. UKEAT/0424/11/ZT (Dec. 20, 
2012).
170. Benkharbouche v. Embassy of the Republic of Sudan; Janah v. Libya [2015] 
EWCA Civ 33.
171. App Nos. 34356/06 & 40528/06 (Jan. 14, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-140005 (ECHR). See also discussion infra note 195–205.
172. Benkharbouche, [2015] EWCA Civ 33 [23] (citing Jones, App Nos. 34356/06 & 
40528/06, ¶ 186).
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immunity was, in that case, “a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim.”173 The Court of Appeal, however, also noted that the 
circumstances of Jones v. United Kingdom were “far removed from 
embassy employment disputes.”174 Examining the jurisprudence of 
the Strasbourg Court, they expressed concern at the latter Court’s 
reasoning in Cudak, Sabeh El Leil, and later cases, specifically its 
interpretation of the scope of international law on state immu-
nity. They noted that important differences between the text of 
the International Law Commission’s 1991 Draft Articles175 and the 
final text of the 2004 UN Convention176 were not addressed in these 
decisions, although both were relied upon by the Strasbourg Court. 
Given such differences, they said, the two texts could not both repre-
sent the current state of customary international law.177
The court went on to inquire into the precise scope of section 
16(1)(a) of the State Immunity Act 1978, and concluded that the blan-
ket immunity provided was neither required by international law, nor 
“within the range of tenable views of what is required by interna-
tional law.”178 Its application in this case, was therefore found to be 
incompatible with the requirements of Article 6 ECHR.
Ms. Janah’s claim was also barred, prima facie, by section 
4(2)(b) of the State Immunity Act because she was not habitually res-
ident in the United Kingdom at the time her contract of employment 
was made; the employment exception created by section 4(1) did not 
therefore apply. The judgment is significant not only in its limiting 
of state immunity and the resulting vindication of domestic workers’ 
right of access to the courts, but also in recognizing that a “habitual 
residence” condition applied at the date of entering into the contract 
of employment constituted discrimination on grounds of nationality 
contrary to Articles 6 and 14 of the ECHR. As the Court of Appeal 
noted, similar habitual residence requirements can be found in 
state immunity laws in several other states, including South Africa, 
Singapore, and Israel. The court’s finding, therefore, will have signifi-
cance beyond these proceedings. In support of its conclusion, the court 
referred to the discussions in the International Law Commission on 
its 1991 Draft Articles (which provide for an additional requirement 
of nationality or habitual residence for the employment exception to 
apply) and the absence of such a requirement in the UN Convention 
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property.179 The 
habitual residence requirement in the U.K. State Immunity Act itself 
gave effect to Article 5(2)(b) of the European Convention on State 
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 150.
176. U.N. Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 
supra note 149.
177. Benkharbouche, [2015] EWCA Civ 33 [29] (point 4).
178. Id. [46].
179. Id. [59]–[60].
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Immunity,180 but this provision of the European Convention was not 
considered to reflect a requirement of customary international law.181
Significantly, the court also concluded that the claims (by both 
claimants) for breach of the Working Time Regulations 1998182 and 
(by Ms. Janah) for racial discrimination and harassment fell within 
the scope of EU law. The claimants were therefore entitled to rely 
on Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights183—the 
right to an effective remedy—which the court concluded was a gen-
eral principle of EU law with horizontal direct effect, and the court 
was required to disapply sections 4(2)(b) and 16(1)(a) of the State 
Immunity Act, in so far as they applied to those parts of the claims 
that fell within the scope of EU law. To the extent that employment 
disputes concerning service staff did not touch upon the sovereign 
functions of the mission staff, the court held that the claims should 
be permitted to proceed. The court therefore applied a functional test 
to the relevance of any possible immunity claim, and ultimately gave 
greater weight to safeguarding the effectiveness of the available 
remedies.
In the case of Mahamdia v. Algeria,184 the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), also recognized employment disputes as 
potentially falling within the scope of permissible exceptions to state 
immunity, following Cudak. In this case, the Landesarbeitsgericht 
Berlin-Brandenburg (Higher Labor Court of Berlin and Brandenburg) 
had asked the CJEU to interpret Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters.185 Continuing the trend of limit-
ing state immunity in the sphere of employment, the CJEU found 
that where the employee’s duties do not engage the exercise of pub-
lic power, the foreign state cannot plead immunity in response to 
employment law proceedings. It is for the national court, in such a 
180. May 16, 1972, 1495 U.N.T.S. 181, E.T.S. No. 074.
181. Benkharbouche, [2015] EWCA Civ 33 [56]–[57] (citing De Queiroz v. State of 
Portugal, 115 I.L.R. 430 (1992)). As described by the Court of Appeal, id. [56],
[in De Queiroz,] the Labor Court of Brussels (Fourth Chamber) held that 
since Portugal had signed but not ratified [the European Convention on State 
Immunity] the convention was not applicable to those proceedings except in 
relation to those of its provisions which are declaratory of customary interna-
tional law. It observed:
“Paragraph 2 of Article 5 does not reproduce a pre-existing rule of cus-
tomary law since it refers to a connecting factor based on the national-
ity of the employee, which negates the theory of restrictive immunity 
based on the distinction between acts of sovereignty performed jure 
imperii and commercial acts performed jure gestionis” ([De Queiroz, 
115 I.L.R. at] 434).
182. SI 1998/1833 (U.K.).
183. Consolidated Version of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 2.
184. Case C-154/11, Mahamdia v. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, EUR-
Lex CELEX 62011CJ0154 (July 19, 2012).
185. 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1.
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dispute, to determine the precise nature of the functions carried out 
by the employee in question.
B.  Access to Courts, Effective Remedies, and State Immunity in  
Respect of Claims for Violations of Jus Cogens Norms
Conflict between jus cogens norms and immunity rules may 
also lead to an alleged violation of Article 6 ECHR, which protects 
the right of access to courts. This issue was considered by the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani 
v. United Kingdom.186 Here, the applicant alleged that the English 
courts, by granting immunity from suit to the State of Kuwait, failed 
to secure enjoyment of his right not to be tortured and denied him 
access to a court, contrary to Articles 3, 6(1), and 13 of the ECHR. 
In dealing with the arguments under Article 6(1), the Court accepted 
that the prohibition of torture had achieved the status of a peremp-
tory norm in international law, however it was “unable to discern 
. . . any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter of international 
law, a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts 
of another State where acts of torture are alleged.”187 The majority 
considered that civil claims must be distinguished in this regard from 
criminal matters, in which the immunity ratione materiae of former 
heads of state for acts constituting violations of jus cogens norms, for 
example, had been eroded. This was a far more contentious decision 
than any of the cases mentioned above, with the Grand Chamber 
split nine votes to eight on the question of the violation of Article 
6(1). The minority judgment written by Judges Rozakis and Caflisch, 
and joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto, and Vajic, 
disagreed on this point with the majority’s distinction between civil 
and criminal claims, and found that, “[d]ue to the interplay of the jus 
cogens rule on prohibition of torture and the rules on State immunity, 
the procedural bar of State immunity is automatically lifted, because 
those rules, as they conflict with a hierarchically higher rule, do not 
produce any legal effect.”188
Despite the strong minority dissent in Al-Adsani, as well as con-
flicting decisions in the Greek189 and Italian supreme courts,190 the 
law in this area has evolved consistently with the majority judgment 
186. 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79. See generally Lorna McGregor, State Immunity and 
Jus Cogens, 55 Int’L & comp. L.Q. 437 (2006).
187. Al-Adsani, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 101 (¶ 61).
188. Id. at 112 (Joint Dissenting Opinion, ¶ 3). See the criticism of the Court’s 
majority decision in Lorna McGregor, Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting 
Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty, 18 eur. J. Int’L L. 903 (2007).
189. Areios Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme Court] 11/2000, Prefecture of Voiotia v. Fed. 
Republic of Germany (May 4, 2000), discussed in Maria Gavouneli & Ilias Bantekas, 
Case Comment, 95 am. J. Int’L L. 198, 200 (2001).
190. Cass., sez. un., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044/04, Ferrini v Federal Republic of 
Germany, 87 rIvISta dI dIrItto InternazIonaLe 539 (2004).
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in Al-Adsani, that is, away from the possibility that jus cogens norms 
trump state immunity.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Jurisdictional 
Immunities (Germany v. Italy) case,191 decided that there was no 
exception to state immunity from the jurisdiction of other states for 
jus cogens violations. In a definitive pronouncement on the applicable 
customary international law, the Court expressed the opinion that “no 
conflict” could exist between the two sets of rules, as they “address 
different matters.”192 The rules of state immunity are “procedural in 
character,”193 and “do not bear upon the question whether or not the 
conduct in respect of which the proceedings are brought was lawful or 
unlawful.”194 If viewed alongside Cudak and Sabeh El Leil, this deci-
sion gives rise to the unsatisfactory position that state immunity is 
inapplicable in most employment cases but remains in place for other 
civil claims based on jus cogens violations.
While the ICJ decision did not touch on the scope of immunity 
of state officials as such, the European Court of Human Rights 
adopted a similar line of reasoning in Jones v. United Kingdom,195 
which involved British citizens alleging torture against the State of 
Saudi Arabia and named state officials. Their claims had failed at the 
domestic level, since state immunity claims function as obstacles to 
access to the courts.196
The European Court of Human Rights in a 6–1 majority judg-
ment considered the ICJ judgment in the Jurisdictional Immunities 
case, which it described as “authoritative as regards the content of 
customary international law.”197 As the European Court of Human 
Rights is a regional human rights court, however, it might have been 
expected that greater consideration would have been given to the 
argument of Judge Cançado Trindade, in his dissenting judgment in 
the Jurisdictional Immunities case, that laws of state immunity must 
be read in light of the “fundamental human values” that underpin the 
development of international law. As Judge Cançado Trindade noted, 
“State immunities are, after all, a ‘prerogative or a privilege.’”198
191. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 
Rep. 99 (Feb. 3). For commentary, see Lorna McGregor, State Immunity and Human 
Rights: Is There a Future After Germany v. Italy?, 11 J. Int’L crIm. JuSt. 125 (2013).
192. Jurisdictional Immunities, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, ¶ 93.
193. Id. ¶ 58.
194. Id. ¶ 93.
195. Jones v. United Kingdom, App Nos. 34356/06 & 40528/06 (Jan. 14, 2014), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-140005. For a discussion on possible jus cogens-
focused exceptions to state immunity, see Noah Benjamin Novogrodsky, Immunity for 
Torture: Lessons from Bouzari v. Iran, 18 eur. J. Int’L L. 939 (2007).
196. See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] 
UKHL 26, [2007] 1 AC 270.
197. Jones, App Nos. 34356/06 & 40528/06, ¶ 198.
198. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Cançado Trindade, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 179, ¶ 40 (Feb. 3).
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The European Court of Human Rights’ decision on the immu-
nity of state officials is more surprising, and reflects a marked shift 
away from the trend towards distinguishing between the immunity 
of the state itself and that enjoyed by state officials. With regard 
to the latter, a greater willingness to limit immunity has been evi-
dent, particularly when lower-level state officials are impugned. The 
Court acknowledged that the law is in “a state of flux” in this area, 
and pointed to “some emerging support in favour of a special rule or 
exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims 
for torture lodged against foreign State officials.”199 Ultimately the 
Court decided, however, that the judgment of the House of Lords at 
the domestic level, to the effect that there was no exception to the civil 
immunity of state officials for jus cogens violations, was “neither man-
ifestly erroneous nor arbitrary.”200 Rather, the judgment “reflected 
generally recognised rules of public international law.”201 The Court 
placed significant weight on the ICJ judgment in Jurisdictional 
Immunities, despite the fact that the ICJ itself had expressly stated 
that “the question of whether, and if so to what extent, immunity 
might apply in criminal proceedings against an official of the State 
is not in issue in the present case.”202 It was “only the immunity of 
the State itself from the jurisdiction of the courts of other States”203 
that was at issue, leaving open the possibility of a diversification of 
approaches to criminal or civil claims involving individual state offi-
cials.204 Ultimately, the Strasbourg Court in Jones v. United Kingdom 
arrived at a “pragmatic understanding” that the definition of “State” 
includes its representatives and that state immunity must not be cir-
cumvented by bringing legal proceedings against named officials.205
A divergent approach can be seen in recent litigation in the U.S., 
in the case of Samantar v. Yousuf. The case concerned the claims of 
five Somali nationals who sought compensatory and punitive damages 
under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims Protection Act,206 
arising from extrajudicial killings and torture at the hands of mili-
tary and intelligence agents of the Somali government in the 1980s. 
As a former Defence Minister and Prime Minister of Somalia, it was 
argued that Mr. Samantar knew or ought to have known of the crimes 
committed by agents under his command. Mr. Samantar accepted lia-
bility, but claimed immunity on the ground that the acts complained 
199. Jones, App Nos. 34356/06 & 40528/06, ¶ 213.
200. Id. ¶ 214.
201. Id. ¶ 215.
202. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 
Rep. 99, ¶ 91 (Feb. 3).
203. Id.
204. See generally HazeL fox & pHILIppa WeBB, tHe LaW of State ImmunIty (3d ed. 
2013).
205. Jones, App Nos. 34356/06 & 40528/06, ¶ 202.
206. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
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of were official acts. The key question that arose, then, was whether 
Mr. Samantar, as an individual official, could benefit from a claim of 
immunity, and if yes, what was the scope of any such immunity claim. 
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court unanimously held that 
officials of foreign states were not covered by the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act207 and that their immunities were governed instead by 
common law.208 The court remanded the case for further proceedings 
and, in 2012, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that 
Mr. Samantar did not enjoy common law immunity in respect of civil 
claims alleging torture.209 “[A]s a matter of international and domes-
tic law,” the court concluded, “jus cogens violations are, by definition, 
acts that are not officially authorized by the Sovereign” and, as such, 
are not covered by foreign official (ratione materiae) immunity.210 The 
court’s conclusion is significant, given its acceptance of a jus cogens-
based exception to immunity. In 2015, the Supreme Court denied the 
petition for a writ of certiorari,211 bringing to an end the attempt by 
Mr. Samantar to rely on his immunity as a foreign official.
The significance of the legal questions raised is reflected in the 
amicus curiae brief submitted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 
support of the petitioner, arguing that the petition raised issues of 
“exceptional importance” to U.S. foreign relations and to foreign gov-
ernments.212 The decision of the Court of Appeals, it was argued, had 
introduced uncertainty and unpredictability into the law of immu-
nity, by introducing a jus cogens exception to possible claims of immu-
nity. It is noteworthy that the amicus brief submitted by the United 
States to the Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the Court of 
Appeals, specifically on the existence of a categorical judicial excep-
tion for cases involving alleged violations of jus cogens norms.213 
(The U.S. government’s position, however, supported the denial of 
immunity by the Court of Appeals, referring in this case to the “dip-
lomatic note” sent to the Government of Somalia confirming that 
the Somali government did not wish to assert immunity on behalf of 
Mr. Samantar.)214 Given the position taken by the Executive in this 
207. 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
208. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010).
209. Samantar v. Yousuf, 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012).
210. Id. at 777, cited in Jones, App Nos. 34356/06 & 40528/06, ¶ 122 (ECHR).
211. Samantar v. Yousuf, 134 S. Ct. 897 (2015). The question presented to the 
Supreme Court was “[w]hether the court of appeals erred in holding that the 
Executive Branch’s determination concerning conduct-based immunity is not binding 
on the court, and in creating a new categorical judicial exception to foreign official 
immunity from civil suits alleging violations of jus cogens norms.” See Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Samantar v. Yousuf, No. 13–1361, 135 S. Ct. 1528 
(2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/samantar-v-yousuf-3/.
212. Brief of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 6, Samantar v. Yousuf, No. 13–1361, 135 S. Ct. 1528 (2015), http://www.
scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/samantar-v-yousuf-3/.
213. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 211, at 21.
214. Id. at 10–11.
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amicus brief, arguments concerning the validity and scope of any jus 
cogens exception are likely to continue.
C. Diplomatic Immunity: At the Limits of Human Rights Protection?
Diplomatic immunity is a well-established rule and a fundamen-
tal element of international law. Central to the observance of the law 
of diplomatic immunity is reciprocity, which serves, as Denza notes, 
as a “constant and effective sanction.”215 Even with regard to rela-
tively minor matters, the “failure to accord privileges or immunities 
to diplomatic missions or to their members is immediately apparent 
and is likely to be met by appropriate countermeasures.”216 This pos-
iting of diplomatic immunity as fundamental to the functioning of 
international relations underscores much of the domestic case law on 
this point and is apparent in the Department of State’s interventions 
in the U.S. litigation. The domestic workers cases thus raise impor-
tant issues concerning the relationship between diplomatic immunity 
and international human rights norms, particularly in the situation 
where the diplomat is still in post.
The more extreme forms of labor exploitation suffered by migrant 
domestic workers working for diplomats raise human rights issues 
linked to trafficking, slavery, servitude, and forced and compulsory 
labor. In the European context, Article 4 of the ECHR has been inter-
preted as imposing positive obligations on states in respect of protect-
ing individuals from such abuses. These obligations, as interpreted in 
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia,217 Siliadin v. France,218 C.N. and V. v. 
France,219 and C.N. v. United Kingdom,220 include criminalizing such 
conduct, putting in place effective deterrent regimes, and effectively 
investigating complaints. In Siliadin and C.N. and V. v. France, the 
French criminal law was found to have provided insufficient and inef-
fective protection for the individuals in those cases, who had gone to 
France and been subjected to domestic forced labor and servitude. 
The Court in Rantsev found that Cyprus had violated its positive obli-
gations of protection under Article 4 by maintaining a visa regime 
which it was aware facilitated trafficking. These decisions are directly 
applicable to the question of domestic workers in diplomatic house-
holds: the interpretation of diplomatic immunity by domestic courts 
means that diplomatic domestic workers are not effectively protected 
from Article 4 violations, and allowing diplomats to bring domestic 
workers into the country in the relatively informal manner described 
215. eILeen denza, dIpLomatIc LaW: commentary on tHe vIenna conventIon on 
dIpLomatIc reLatIonS 2 (3d ed. 2008).
216. Id. at 2.
217. 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 65 (extracts), full judgment available at http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-96549.
218. 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333.
219. App. No. 67724/09 (Oct. 11, 2012) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-114032.
220. App. No. 4239/08 (Nov. 13, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-114518.
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above, together with the operation of immunity, facilitates the traf-
ficking of these workers for the purposes of domestic work.
The European Court of Human Rights has consistently empha-
sized the fundamental and non-derogable nature of the Article 4 
ECHR provisions and the absence of exceptions to these rights.221 
The immunity from criminal prosecution, as well as the denial of 
civil redress for these forms of abuse, thus raises serious questions in 
respect of states’ obligations under Article 4 and the issue of whether 
cases involving Article 4 rights constitute an exception to diplomatic 
immunity. The potential conflict between states’ Article 4 obligations 
and the implementation of diplomatic immunity has not been liti-
gated before the Strasbourg Court as yet. In the U.S. case of Sabbithi 
v. Al Saleh222 mentioned earlier, however, it was argued that the dip-
lomat and his wife trafficked three domestic workers to work in their 
home and that trafficking in human beings is a jus cogens exception 
to diplomatic immunity as a violation of jus cogens norms prohibiting 
slavery.
Ms. Sabbithi and two other domestic workers had worked previ-
ously in the home of a Kuwaiti diplomat, Mr. Al Saleh, in Kuwait, and 
before coming to the United States they signed an employment con-
tract which provided that U.S. labor law for domestic workers would 
apply to their employment. However, on arrival in the United States, 
the defendants (Mr. Al Saleh and his wife) did not comply with the 
terms of the employment contract and forced the plaintiffs to work 
up to nineteen hours a day, seven days a week. They received no sal-
ary directly (some payments instead being made to the workers’ fami-
lies overseas), their passports were confiscated, they were threatened, 
and Ms. Sabbithi was physically abused. On escape from the diplo-
mat’s home, the plaintiffs instituted civil proceedings which turned 
on a number of arguments, including that diplomatic immunity could 
not apply because the actions complained of violated jus cogens norms 
prohibiting slavery and slavery-like practices.223 The U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia stated (without any analysis) that, 
on the facts, the defendants’ conduct did not amount to trafficking and 
there was therefore no jus cogens norm at issue, meaning that it did 
not have to decide on the jus cogens exception.224 However, even if it 
had, the court referred to the U.S. government’s view (outlined in the 
Statement of Interest) that “there is no jus cogens exception to dip-
lomatic immunity” and “there is not evidence that the international 
221. See, e.g., Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 367 (¶ 112); Rantsev, 2010-I Eur. 
Ct. H.R. at 124 (¶ 282).
222. 605 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2009).
223. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, defines a jus cogens norm as “a peremptory norm of general inter-
national law . . . from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”
224. Sabbithi, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 129.
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community has come to recognize a jus cogens exception to diplomatic 
immunity.”225 This illustrates the U.S. courts’ consistent rejection of 
the argument that the VCDR must be interpreted in a manner that is 
consistent with human rights law.
As already noted, the potential conflict between the law of immu-
nity and jus cogens rules has not yet been tested in the Article 4 
ECHR context, nor has the specific application of the law of diplomatic 
immunity in the context of domestic workers come under scrutiny by 
the European Court of Human Rights. However, the trend observed 
in Al-Adsani226 and Jones227 suggests a cautious approach whereby 
the Court will be reluctant to recognize a human rights exception to 
immunity. In respect of civil claims—even in respect of employment 
law violations which would constitute slavery, servitude, or forced or 
compulsory labor—it would be very difficult for a domestic worker to 
successfully argue that diplomatic immunity violates his or her right 
of access to a court under Article 6(1), as there would seem to be no 
universal practice of providing an exception to diplomatic immunity 
in these cases (unlike in the case of state immunity in employment 
disputes, as seen in Cudak228 and Sabeh El Leil229). States thus con-
tinue to be unconstrained by the ECHR in their application of diplo-
matic immunity in respect of most employment-related claims taken 
by domestic workers working for diplomats.
As the sole dissenting judge in Jones pointed out, it is difficult 
to accept that the Court would waive state immunity in employment 
cases such as Cudak and Sabeh El Leil but not in a case concern-
ing redress for torture.230 Judge Kalaydjieva also criticized the dis-
tinction that this approach appears to create in international law 
between the application of civil immunity and criminal immunity in 
cases involving the violation of jus cogens norms, given developments 
in the sphere of universal criminal jurisdiction and the findings of 
the House of Lords in Pinochet No.3.231 This distinction means that 
while criminal immunity for diplomats for offenses related to slavery, 
225. Id. The American Civil Liberties Union reports that the Kuwaiti government 
agreed to a confidential settlement in February 2012. Case Profile—Sabbithi, et al. 
v. Al Saleh, et al., am. cIvIL LIBertIeS unIon (last updated Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.
aclu.org/human-rights-womens-rights/case-profile-sabbithi-et-al-v-al-saleh-et-al.
226. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79.
227. Jones v. United Kingdom, App Nos. 34356/06 & 40528/06 (Jan. 14, 2014), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-140005.
228. Cudak v. Lithuania, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 153.
229. Sabeh El Leil v. France, App. No. 34869/05 (June 19, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-105378.
230. Jones, App Nos. 34356/06 & 40528/06, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Kalaydjieva. For a critique, see also Lorna McGregor, Jones v. U.K.: A Disappointing 
End, eJIL: taLk!—BLog of tHe eur. J. Int’L L. (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/
jones-v-uk-a-disappointing-end/; Philippa Webb, Jones v UK: The Re-integration of 
State and Official Immunity?, eJIL: taLk!—BLog of tHe eur. J. Int’L L. (Jan. 14, 2014), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/jones-v-uk-the-re-integration-of-state-and-official-immunity/.
231. R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte (No. 3) [1999] 1 AC 147 (HL) (U.K.).
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servitude, or forced labor could conceivably be found to violate states’ 
positive obligations of criminalization and prosecution under Article 
4, diplomatic domestic workers seeking to vindicate employment 
rights through civil claims remain in a legal wilderness. The protec-
tive potential of Article 4 for domestic workers in severely exploit-
ative situations that has been unlocked in recent jurisprudence is 
thus effectively denied for diplomatic domestic workers.
The fragmentation of international law rules on jurisdictional 
immunities came into sharp relief before the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales in the case of Reyes and Another v. Al-Malki,232 a 
judgment that was handed down on the same day as Benkharbouche.233 
The case reveals the precariousness of human rights protections 
and the limited effectiveness of law’s remedies even in the face of an 
acknowledged violation of human rights standards and a criminal act. 
The claimants in this case, Philippine and Indonesian nationals, were 
employed as domestic workers by the respondents, a Saudi diplomatic 
agent and his wife. Both worked at the official diplomatic residence. 
U.K. Visas and Immigration, a division of the U.K. Home Office, had 
determined that both women were victims of human trafficking. Both 
claimants brought proceedings before an employment tribunal alleg-
ing, inter alia, that they had suffered racial discrimination and harass-
ment and had been paid less than the national minimum wage. The 
claimants were successful before the Employment Tribunal, which 
found that the exception in Article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention 
must be read consistently with Article 6 ECHR. This finding was 
reversed, however, by the Employment Appeals Tribunal. Ms. Reyes 
then appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal. (The second claim-
ant, Ms. Suryadi, no longer participated in the proceedings.)
The case turned in part on the precise meaning of the commer-
cial activity exception provided for in Article 31(1)(c) VCDR and the 
immunities distinction in international law between acta jure impe-
rii and acta jure gestionis. The claimants argued, with the support of 
the domestic workers’ advocacy group Kalayaan, that Article 31(1)(c) 
VCDR should be construed in the light of the high status of the pro-
hibition on human trafficking in international law and the incompat-
ibility of engagement in human trafficking with the proper discharge 
of diplomatic functions.
Citing the judgment of the Strasbourg Court in Rantsev,234 the 
claimants argued that upholding the respondents’ claim to immu-
nity would be in violation of the United Kingdom’s positive obliga-
tions under Article 4 ECHR, specifically: (i) the duty to provide 
232. [2015] EWCA Civ 32.
233. Benkharbouche v. Embassy of the Republic of Sudan; Janah v. Libya [2015] 
EWCA Civ 33.
234. 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 65 (extracts), full judgment available at http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-96549.
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compensation as required by Article 15(3) of the Council of Europe 
Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings;235 (ii) 
“the ‘positive obligation to put in place an appropriate legislative 
and administrative framework’ to give practical and effective protec-
tion against trafficking and exploitation”;236 and (iii) “the obligation 
to provide for an effective investigation.”237 On the last point, it was 
noted that the only way in which the investigative obligation aris-
ing could be discharged might be through ensuring the availability 
of civil proceedings, given that the Saudi authorities had refused to 
waive immunity.
The Court of Appeal concluded that there was no established rule 
of international law on human trafficking that took precedence over 
the international law rules on diplomatic immunity, which, it reit-
erated, were “well-established.”238 On the question of whether the 
restriction on the right of access to the courts arising from a diplo-
matic immunity claim conflicted with the general right of access to 
the courts under Article 6 ECHR, the court took the view that “the 
recognition of diplomatic immunity in civil proceedings pursue[d] the 
legitimate aim of complying with a State’s international law obliga-
tions to prevent hindrance to the diplomat in performing his func-
tions.”239 The conclusion was not in the court’s view, “controversial.”240
The court accepted that upholding the claim to diplomatic immu-
nity might appear an affront to “justice and fairness,”241 but concluded 
that this outcome simply reflected “policy choices already made”;242 
the “apparent inequity to a private individual [was] outweighed by 
the great injury to the public that would arise” in rejecting the immu-
nity claim presented.243 Engaging in this balancing exercise in itself, 
however, suggests that the outcome was not inevitable and not simply 
the result of policy choices already made. The court was at pains to 
highlight what it viewed as “the clear distinction”244 between state 
and diplomatic immunity—diplomatic immunity being “functional in 
nature,”245 while state immunity was a concept of international law 
developed from the principle par in parem non habet imperium.246 
While there was evidence that international law on state immunity 
had evolved, notably through the 2004 UN Convention, the Court did 
235. May 16, 2005, 2569 U.N.T.S. 33, C.E.T.S. No. 197. See Reyes, [2015] EWCA Civ 
32 [49].
236. Reyes, [2015] EWCA Civ 32 [50].
237. Id. [51].
238. Id. [64].
239. Id. [68].
240. Id.
241. Id. [77].
242. Id. (quoting Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 1996)).
243. Id. (quoting Tabion, 73 F.3d at 539).
244. Id. [73].
245. Id. [74].
246. Id. [73].
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not find any evidence to suggest that the “international community” 
was in favor of a similar adjustment to diplomatic immunity.247
The concept of community invoked here, of course, is one that has 
rested on often highly gendered distinctions between the public and 
the private. Claims of communities are often exclusionary, and the 
communitarian impulse underpinning the weight given to “comity 
between nations” and diplomatic functioning is no exception.248
D. On the Relevance of Equality and Non-Discrimination Norms
The obligations of effective deterrence that arise from forced 
labor, slavery, and trafficking prohibitions are enshrined in several 
international and regional instruments, including the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,249 the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,250 the Palermo 
Protocol,251 and the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against 
Trafficking in Human Beings.252 Developing obligations of due dili-
gence at the regional and international levels have highlighted the 
nexus between states’ positive obligations of prevention and non-
discrimination norms in ways that are potentially of significance to 
domestic workers. The European Court of Human Rights has repeat-
edly recognized that a state’s positive obligations under the ECHR 
go beyond the imposition of criminal sanctions and include polic-
ing and operative measures. In Opuz v. Turkey, for the first time in 
Strasbourg case law, the Court linked states’ obligations to combat 
domestic violence to the Article 14 ECHR non-discrimination require-
ments.253 More generally, the gradual expansion of indirect discrimi-
nation prohibitions suggests possible strategies for such challenges.254 
The Jessica Lenahan case before the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights,255 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 
“Campo Algodonero” case,256 and others similarly point to the non-dis-
crimination nexus. Given that the majority of domestic workers are 
women, a similar nexus between diplomatic immunity, positive obli-
gations, and non-discrimination norms arises. The Advisory Opinion 
247. Id. [74].
248. The decision of the Supreme Court of Portugal in Fonseca v. Larren (Jan. 30, 
1991, unreported), cited by the claimants, was dismissed as a “solitary authority” and 
of “little value as evidence of the contents of international law.” Reyes, [2015] EWCA 
Civ 32 [74].
249. Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
250. Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
251. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially 
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319.
252. Supra note 235.
253. 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 107.
254. See D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic, 2007-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 241.
255. Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Merits, 
Report No. 80/11, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 69 (2011).
256. Gonzalez (“Cotton Fields”) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009).
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of the Inter-American Court on the Juridical Condition and Rights 
of the Undocumented Migrants points to the transformative promise 
that underpins human rights standards.257 Fitting into the discrimi-
nation paradigm is not without its difficulties, however, and it is a 
strategy that brings many pitfalls, particularly when the claimant is 
required to identify an appropriate comparator.258
The European Court of Human Rights has only recently begun, 
after a period of stagnation, to develop a “larger and bolder” antidis-
crimination case law.259 The late development of this body of case law 
in the field of non-discrimination is all the more surprising given the 
Court’s advanced jurisprudence on positive human rights obligations in 
general.260 In contrast, as Besson notes, the non-discrimination regime of 
the European Social Charter261 has always been interpreted as imposing 
a “positive duty to take action to protect equality ‘in practice,’” its juris-
prudence going well beyond the more tentative conclusions of the ECHR 
regime to date.262 Besson further notes that the principle of non-discrim-
ination is “pivotal” within international human rights law, revealing, as 
it does, “the social or collective dimension of individual human rights.”263 
For domestic workers in diplomatic households, the limits of individual-
ized remedies are evident. To date, the European Court of Human Rights 
has not examined or acknowledged the potential links between Article 4 
and Article 14 claims, though the nexus with non-discrimination norms 
has been pointed to in submissions to the Court.264 For now, the potential 
for this body of case law to extend into the realm of the diplomatic house-
hold remains to be realized. The importance of extending such norms 
into previously “closed circuits” has been recognized by the Court in the 
context of domestic violence,265 the laws on which have often followed a 
similar trajectory to those regulating domestic work.266
257. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory 
Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶ (Sept. 17, 2003).
258. See aLIce edWardS, vIoLence agaInSt Women under InternatIonaL Human rIgHtS 
LaW (2010), especially ch. 4, Equality and Non-Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, at 140.
259. Samantha Besson, Evolutions in Non-Discrimination Law Within the ECHR 
and the ESC Systems: It Takes Two to Tango in the Council of Europe, 60 am. J. comp. 
L. 147, 148 (2012)
260. Id. at 175.
261. European Social Charter (Revised), Council of Eur., May 3, 1996, E.T.S. No. 
163. See especially Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter, Council of Eur., 
May 5, 1988, ETS No. 128.
262. Besson, supra note 259, at 174 & n.144 (citing 2 eur. comm. of Soc. rIgHtS, 
european SocIaL cHarter: concLuSIonS 2003, xvI-II (SpaIn)—artIcLe 1 addItIonaL 
protocoL 939 (2003)).
263. Id. at 179.
264. See Third Party Intervention Submission of Interights (Nov. 24, 2010), Kawogo 
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 56921/09 (ECHR), available at http://www.interights.
org/kawogo/index.html. The case was subsequently struck out by the Court follow-
ing an application by the United Kingdom. See Kawogo v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
56921/09 (Sept. 3, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-126789.
265. Opuz v. Turkey, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 146 (¶ 132). See Siobhán Mullally, 
Migration, Gender, and the Limits of Rights, in Human rIgHtS and ImmIgratIon 145 
(Ruth Rubio-Marín ed., 2014).
266. See generally ronagH J.a. mcQuIgg, InternatIonaL Human rIgHtS LaW and 
domeStIc vIoLence (2011).
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concLuSIon
Migrant domestic workers are “hard to locate on the map of 
democracy.”267 The movement of migrant domestic workers across 
multiple jurisdictional boundaries, between states as well as from the 
“public” domain into the “private” domain of the home, is central to the 
constructed vulnerability of the domestic worker.268 Law plays a dual 
role here, jealously guarding the public borders of the state through 
immigration laws while at the same time “reifying the private borders 
of the home.”269 For domestic workers in diplomatic households, this 
division between the public and private is exacerbated by the juris-
dictional walls created by diplomatic and state immunity claims. The 
deference that continues to be paid to diplomatic immunity claims, 
and to a more limited extent to state immunity, does not sit easily 
with international legal standards safeguarding rights of access to 
the courts and to effective remedies, particularly in cases where a 
criminal offence is alleged or in employment-related disputes where 
the inequality in bargaining power between the claimant and the 
respondent is marked. For the moment, the law continues to exclude 
and to deny the potentiality of rights claims against those who are 
serving diplomats. The everydayness of domestic work supports the 
categorization of such work as falling outside of commercial activ-
ity exceptions to diplomatic immunity and at the same time as being 
integral to the conduct of daily life (of diplomats). For domestic work-
ers in both cases, this categorization results in legal remedies being 
rendered ineffective.
To quote Lord Denning, it is increasingly argued that it is “more 
in keeping with the dignity of a foreign sovereign [or diplomat] to 
submit himself to the rule of law than to claim to be above it.”270 In its 
submissions during the negotiating process on the 2011 ILO Domestic 
Work Convention, the RESPECT network specifically highlighted the 
need for enhanced protections for domestic workers in diplomatic 
households.271 Again, in the final stages of negotiating, domestic work-
ers’ representatives called for the inclusion of additional provisions 
addressing the position of domestic workers in diplomatic households. 
These calls, however, went unheeded. This was an opportunity missed 
for the international community, and for domestic workers. A move 
towards expansion of multilateral standards could overcome the 
267. Joseph Carens, Live-In Domestics, Seasonal Workers, and Others Hard to 
Locate on the Map of Democracy, 16 J. poL. pHIL. 419 (2008).
268. Judy Fudge, Global Care Chains, Employment Agencies, and the Conundrum 
of Jurisdiction: Decent Work for Domestic Workers in Canada, 23 canadIan J. Women & 
L. 235 (2011).
269. Adelle Blackett, Promoting Domestic Workers: Human Dignity Through 
Specific Regulation, in domeStIc ServIce and tHe formatIon of european IdentIty: 
underStandIng tHe gLoBaLIzatIon of domeStIc Work, 16tH–21St centurIeS 247, 247 
(Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux ed., 2005), cited in Fudge, supra note 268, at 243.
270. Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad [1958] AC 379, 418 (HL) (U.K.).
271. RESPECT Network, supra note 73, at 6 (Key Recommendation no. 5).
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limits of bilateral attempts at reform, where the predictable trade-off 
between access to jobs and workers’ rights too frequently kicks in.272
As cases such as Benkharbouche suggest, rights claims present 
an “alternative legality” to that presumed to follow from the juris-
dictional lines traditionally drawn by laws of diplomatic and state 
immunity. The increasing recognition of exceptions to state immunity 
represents an acknowledgment that international law may serve not 
only the purpose of “comity between nations” but also the effective 
vindication of individual rights, including those often considered to 
be “superfluous” subjects.273 Yet, jurisdictional immunities, both of 
the state and the diplomatic agent, continue to function as barri-
ers to claiming rights and effective remedies. Even when faced with 
an egregious harm and a violation of a non-derogable human rights 
norm, immunity claims may trump a core tenet of the rule of law—
the transformative potential inherent in securing the right of access 
to the courts.
Although courts continue to acknowledge the unfairness result-
ing from immunity claims, they hide behind “policy choices already 
made.” How and where the lines of jurisdictional immunities are 
drawn, however, is not predetermined. Neither is it a legal process 
that leads to an inevitable outcome, rejecting the alterative legalities 
presented by individual litigants. Human rights standards and labor 
standards bring with them a “jurisgenerative” potential, to borrow 
from Robert Cover.274 As yet, it is a potential that has not been real-
ized for domestic workers in diplomatic households. The fragmenta-
tion of international law rules on state and diplomatic immunity and 
the divergences in how immunity claims function in civil and crimi-
nal proceedings create dissonance and confusion. They also reveal, 
however, the possibilities of transformative strategies that seek to 
redefine the “declared values” of international law—viewed through 
the claims of litigants in diverse jurisdictions and in a plurality of 
courts and tribunals.
272. Labor and Migration in International Law: Challenges of Protection, 
Specialization, and Bilateralism, 105 am. Soc’y Int’L L. proc. 407, 411–12 (2011) 
(panel contribution by Nisha Varia, Senior Researcher, Women’s Rights Division, 
Human Rights Watch).
273. Susan Marks, Law and the Production of Superfluity, 2 tranSnat’L LegaL 
tHeory 1 (2011).
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